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The plaintiff/appellant, Kenneth Riddle, pursuant to 
Rule 24(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, submits the 
following Brief. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j)(1988) and Rule 3(a) of 
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. This is an appeal from a 
final Order and Judgment of the Fifth Judicial District Court 
in and for Iron County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. 
Phillip Eves presiding. The Order and Judgment entered by the 
trial court granted the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and denied the plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that the plain-
tiff's complaint was barred by the exclusive remedy provision 
of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 (1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issues are presented to this Court for 
review: 
1. Did the district court err in concluding, as a 
matter of law, that Ken Riddle, an employee of Owens-Corning, 
may not pursue a claim for personal injuries against Alan 
Mays, an employee of a subcontractor of Owens-Corning, such 
claim being barred by the exclusive remedy provision of Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-60? 
2. Did the trial court err by failing to conclude, 
as a matter of law, that Ken Riddle, an employee of Owens-
Corning, may pursue a claim for personal injuries against Alan 
Mays, an employee of a subcontractor of Owens-Corning, such 
claim not being barred by the exclusive remedy provision of 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
This Court's interpretation of the following statutes 
is determinative of the issues presented for review. Pursuant 
to Rule 24(a)(6) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, these 
statutes are set our verbatim in Appendix A of the Addendum to 
this Brief. 
1. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42(3)(b) (1987); 
2. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 (1987); 
3. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62 (1987). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case. 
This is a negligence action brought by the plaintiff 
against the defendants for injuries sustained by the plaintiff 
in a truck wreck on January 2, 1985 at the Intermountain Power 
Project ("IPP"). At the time of the accident, the plaintiff 
was sitting in a parked truck which was hit by a truck driven 
by the defendant Alan Mays. Both men were on the job, within 
the scope of their employment, when the accident happened. The 
plaintiff was employed by Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation 
("Owens-Corning"), an insulation subcontractor at IPP to 
install insulation and paneling and to erect a warehouse. The 
defendant Mays was employed by Mountain States Insulation Corp. 
("MSI"), a subcontractor of Owens-Corning, providing labor to 
erect the warehouse. The plaintiff's Complaint seeks special 
and general damages from the defendants based upon the 
negligence of the defendant Mays, acting within the scope and 
course of his employment with the defendant MSI. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
After the plaintiff's Complaint was filed and some 
discovery conducted, the defendants moved for summary judgment 
on the grounds that the plaintiff's Complaint was barred by the 
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exclusive remedy provision of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60. The 
plaintiff filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment that, as a 
matter of law, his Complaint was not barred by that exclusive 
remedy provision. 
After reviewing the memoranda submitted by the 
parties and hearing oral argument, the Honorable J. Phillip 
Eves of the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County, State 
of Utah, granted the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and denied the plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
These rulings are set forth in Orders dated, respectively, May 
4, 1988 and June 15, 1988. 
The transcript of the April 19, 1988 hearing at 
which Judge Eves issued his decision is attached as Appendix B 
of the Addendum to this Brief pursuant to Rule 24(f) of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
C. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
The issues to be decided by this Court are based on 
facts essentially not in dispute. Those facts are: 
1. Bechtel was the general contractor at IPP. (R. 
p. 322; Appendix C, page 1.) 
2. Owens-Corning was an insulation subcontractor at 
IPP to install insulation and paneling and to erect a 
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warehouse- (R. pp. 322 and 371(3); Riddle Deposition, pages 11 
and 15; Reporter's Transcript, Appendix B, p. 3.) 
3. The plaintiff, Kenneth Riddle ("Riddle"), was 
employed by Owens-Corning. (R. pp. 310, 32 3 and 371(3); Riddle 
Deposition, pp 10 and 15; Reporter's Transcript, Appendix B, p. 
3.) 
4. Owens-Corning subcontracted with Mountain States 
Insulation ("MSI") for MSI to provide labor to erect the 
warehouse. (R. pp. 310, 323 and 371(6); Riddle Deposition, p. 
18; Recorder's Transcript, Appendix B, p. 6; Appendix D, p. 2.) 
5. The defendant Alan Mays ("Mays") was an employee 
of the defendant MSI. (R. pp. 1, 310, 323 and 371(6); Riddle 
Deposition, pp. 19 and 94; Reporter's Transcript, Appendix B, 
p. 6; Appendix D, p. 2.) 
6. The plaintiff was injured at IPP when the parked 
truck he was sitting in was hit by a truck driven by the 
defendant Alan Mays. (R. pp. 1-4 and 323.) 
7. Both Riddle and Mays were on the job, within the 
scope of their employment, when the accident happened. (R. pp 
1, 310, 32 3; Appendix C, p. 2; Appendix D, p. 2.) 
Additional facts material to this Court's 
determination of this appeal are found in the defendants' 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and 
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the plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment and in Support of his Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Those memoranda are attached as Appendix C 
and Appendix D of the Addendum to this Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in 
concluding, as a matter of law, that the plaintiff's Complaint 
was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-60. The plaintiff's arguments are based on the language 
and history of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42 (3) (b) ("Section 42"), 
defining those liable for worker's compensation benefits and 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62 ("Section 62"), defining those parties 
against whom an injured worker may pursue tort claims. The 
plaintiff's arguments are also based on the decisions of this 
Court construing those statutes, with particular attention to 
the effect of the 1975 Legislative amendments to Section 62. 
Before the 1975 amendments to Section 62, this Court 
had been applying the Section 42 expanded definition of "sta-
tutory employer" to determine those immune from tort liability 
under Section 62. The effect of those decisions was to 
insulate from tort liability virtually everyone on the 
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jobsite. The 1975 Legislative amendments to Section 62 
clarified that the definition of "statutory employer" in 
Section 42 was not to be used in determining who is or is not 
subject to tort liability under Section 62. 
The 1975 amendments to Section 62 preserved an 
injured worker's tort claim against anyone on the jobsite not 
the actual employer of the injured worker. The plaintiff's 
actual employer is Owens-Corning. The plaintiff is allowed to 
pursue his claim against the defendants, as MSI is a 
subcontractor of Owens-Corning. This issue was addressed by 
this Court in Shupe v. Wasatch Electric Co., 546 P.2d 896 (Utah 
1976). The Shupe decision controls this appeal by holding that 
an injured worker may pursue tort claims against a 
subcontractor of his actual employer. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANTS ARE NOTr AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
BARRED BY THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-60 
A. The Language and Legislative History of Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-62 and the Shupe Decision of This Court Allow the 
Plaintiff's Claim to Proceed. 
The determination of the issues on appeal in this 
case requires understanding the purposes of and relationship 
between Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42 (3) (b) ("Section 42") and Utah 
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Code Ann. §35-1-62 ("Section 62") as they relate to the 
exclusive remedy provision of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 ("Section 
60"). Section 42 and Section 62 have distinct purposes. 
Section 42 defines those liable for worker's compensation 
benefits and reads as follows: 
Where any employer procures any work to be 
done wholly or in part for him by a 
contractor over whose work he retains 
supervision or control, and this work is a 
part or process in the trade or business of 
the employer, the contractor, all persons 
employed by him, all subcontractors under 
himf and all persons employed by any of 
these subcontractors, are considered 
employees of the original employer. 
Section 62 defines those parties against whom an 
injured worker may pursue tort claims and reads, in pertinent 
part, as follows: 
When any injury or death for which 
compensation is payable under this title 
shall have been caused by the wrongful act 
or neglect of a person other than an 
employer, officer, agent, or employee of 
said employer, the injured employee, or in 
case of death, his dependents, may claim 
compensation and the injured employee or 
his heirs or personal representatives may 
also have an action for damages against 
such third person. . . . 
For the purposes of this section and 
notwithstanding the provisions of section 
35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs 
or personal representatives may also 
maintain an action for damages against 
subcontractors, general contractors, 
independent contractors, property owners or 
8 
their lessees or assigns, not occupying an 
employee-employer relationship with the 
injured or deceased employee at the time of 
his injury or death. 
Section 42 represents a class of statutes known as 
"statutory employer" statutes. The statutes are designed to 
allow injured workers to reach beyond irresponsible, uninsured 
actual employers to receive worker's compensation benefits if 
they are injured on the job. These "statutory employer" 
statutes impose ultimate liability for benefits on contractors 
exercising the requisite supervision and control over the work 
of the injured worker. Jacobson v. Industrial Commission, 738 
P.2d 658 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). The entire "statutory employer" 
scheme demonstrates a desire on the part of the Legislature to 
extend the protection and scope of worker's compensation 
benefits to those who might not be deemed employees under the 
common law. Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305 
(Utah 1984). Because the purpose of "statutory employer" 
statutes is to broaden those parties from whom an injured 
worker may seek compensation benefits, this Court has stated 
that Section 42 should be construed broadly in favor of 
protecting the injured worker to ensure that he or she 
receives the appropriate benefits. Bennett v. Industrial 
Commission, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). 
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Section 42, therefore, expands the definition of 
those liable for worker's compensation benefits beyond the 
worker's actual employer* The "statutory employer" concept 
provides assurance that benefits will be available to an 
injured worker if his actual employer proves irresponsible and 
doesn't have worker's compensation insurance. It pressures 
general contractors to make sure the subcontractors on the 
project are insured. The concept is salutary as it increases 
the possibilities that any worker injured on a construction 
project will be able to tap into worker's compensation 
benefits. 
Section 42 does not address tort liability. As 
stated by Justice Maughan in his dissenting opinion in Shupe v. 
Wasatch Electric Company, Inc., 546 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1976): 
The Legislature in enacting Section 35-1-42 
was not concerned with third-party tort 
liability; its purpose was to establish a 
general statutory definition of an 
employer, to assure that a general 
contractor would guarantee compensation for 
the employees of a subcontractor. 
Section 62, on the other hand, allows tort claims by 
injured workers against third parties not in an actual 
employer-employee relationship with the injured worker. The 
language of Section 62, defining the parties against whom a 
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tort claim may be pursued, has changed over the years to effect 
the intent of the Legislature. 
Before 1939, Section 62 allowed an injured worker to 
pursue tort claims against a negligent "third person." In 
1939, the "third person" language was changed to allow tort 
claims against "another person not in the same employment" as 
the injured employee. This 19 39 change in the language of 
Section 62 was designed to protect the injured worker's actual 
employer and co-employees from tort claims because the actual 
employer was liable to the injured worker for worker's 
compensation benefits. 
After the 1939 amendments to Section 62, allowing 
tort claims against "another person not in the same employment" 
as the injured employee, something unforeseen and unintended by 
the Legislature happened. To determine who was "in the same 
employment" as the injured worker under Section 62 and thus 
immune from tort liability under Section 60, this Court began 
applying the "statutory employer" definition of Section 42. In 
other words, this Court applied the expansive definition of 
employer found in Section 42, used to define those liable for 
worker's compensation benefits, to determine who was in the 
same employment as the injured worker and immune from tort 
liability under Section 62. 
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The practical effect of these decisions was to 
insulate from tort liability everybody on the jobsite. As a 
practical matter under Section 42, everyone on a project had a 
common statutory employer, usually the general contractor. 
Therefore, all were "statutory co-employees" deemed to be "in 
the same employment" under Section 62 and unable to pursue tort 
claims. The exclusive remedy provision of Section 60 was 
applied to bar tort claims whether the injured worker was suing 
a contractor "upstream" or "downstream." 
For the purposes of this Brief, "upstream" 
contractors are those contractors who would qualify as 
statutory employers of an injured worker because of the 
supervision and control exercised over the work of the injured 
worker's actual employer. "Downstream" contractors are other 
contractors on the project who do not exercise supervision or 
control over the injured worker's actual employer and who, 
consequently, could not be responsible for the injured worker's 
worker's compensation benefits. 
Examples of the Utah Supreme Court decisions barring 
tort claims of injured workers against those not their actual 
employers, by applying the Section 42 "statutory employer" 
language, include; Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 139, 442 
P.2d 31 (1968)(tort claim of employee of general contactor 
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against excavation subcontractor barred; Smith v. Alfred Brown 
Co., 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994 (1972)(tort claim of employee 
of masonry subcontractor against general contractor barred); 
Peterson v. Fowler, 27 Utah 2d 159, 493 P.2d 997 (1972) (claim 
of employee of general contractor against ceiling tile sub-
contractor barred); Adamson v. Okland Construction Company, 29 
Utah 2d 286, 508 P. 2d 805 (1973) (tort claim of employee of 
electrical subcontractor against general contractor barred). 
In 1975, the Utah Legislature amended Section 62 to 
clarify those subject to third-party tort liability. The 
Legislature was aware of the decisions of this Court applying 
the Section 42 employer definition to the "same employment" 
language of Section 62 and the generalized immunity that 
interpretation had created on the jobsite. The "same 
employment" language of Section 62 was, therefore, amended to 
read that a tort claim could be maintained by an injured worker 
against "a person other than an employer, officer, agent, or 
employee of said employer." The Legislature also added the 
following significant language to Section 62: 
For the purposes of this section and 
notwithstanding the provisions of section 
35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs 
or personal representative may also 
maintain an action for damages against 
subcontractors, general contractors, 
independent contractors, property owners or 
their lessees or assigns, not occupying an 
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employee-employer relationship with the 
injured or deceased employee at the time of 
his injury or death, (Emphasis added.) 
The language and legislative intent of these 1975 
amendments are clear. The expansive definition of "statutory 
employer" in Section 42, used to determine liability for 
compensation benefits, is not to be used in determining who is 
or is not subject to tort liability under Section 62. The 
judicially-created interplay between Section 42 and Section 62 
was expressly eliminated by the Legislature. The injured 
worker's tort claim was preserved against all those "not 
occupying an employer-employee relationship" with the injured 
employee. 
The plaintiff contends that, this 1975 amendment 
allows an injured worker to pursue tort claims against anyone 
on the jobsite other than his actual employer. This would 
include "upstream" contractors who may qualify as the injured 
worker's "statutory employer," as well as "downstream" 
contractors exercising no supervision or control over the 
injured worker. 
The decisions of this Court interpreting the 19 7 5 
amendments to Section 6 2 have created some confusion as to the 
parties on the jobsite against whom an injured worker may 
pursue tort claims. 
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The first opportunity for this Court to address the 
1975 amendments to Section 62 came in Shupe v. Wasatch Electric 
Co. , 546 P.2d 896 (Utah 1976). In that case, the heirs of the 
deceased employee of a general contractor brought a wrongful 
death action against an electrical subcontractor. The accident 
causing the general contractor's employee's death happened 
before the 1975 amendments to Section 62 became effective. 
Applying the pre-1975 "same employment" language and following 
the judicial precedent of Adamsonf Smith, Peterson and 
Gallegos, the trial court found that the general contractor's 
employee and the subcontractor were "in the same employment" 
and granted summary judgment in favor of the subcontractor 
based on the exclusive remedy provision of Section 60. On 
appeal, this Court addressed the effect of the 1975 amendments 
to Section 62. 
Justice Tucker, noting that the Legislature was 
"undoubtedly aware of the decisions of this court construing 
the terms 'same employment'," stated that, "the amendment, if 
applicable, would leave the plaintiffs in court." Ri. at 898. 
The summary judgment in favor of the subcontractor, like that 
granted in this case, would, therefore, have been reversed if 
the 1975 amendments to Section 62 had applied. The Court held, 
however, that the amendments had no retroactive application, 
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that the pre-1975 "same employment" language applied and, 
therefore, affirmed the trial court. 
The plaintiff here contends that the Shupe decision 
controls this appeal. The 1975 amendment language does apply 
to this case and, under Shupe, an injured worker may pursue a 
claim against a subcontractor of his employer. MSI is a 
subcontractor of Owens-Corning, the plaintiff's actual 
employer. Under Shupe, the exclusive remedy provision of 
Section 60 does not bar the plaintiff's claim. Ken Riddle 
may, as a matter of law, pursue his claim against MSI and Mays. 
In 1978, this Court decided Hinds v. Herm Hughes & 
Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 561 (Utah 1978). The Hinds decision does 
not control this appeal, but needs to be addressed because it 
was raised in the trial court and because of the confusion it 
has created regarding third-party tort claims. 
The relationship of the parties in Hinds is similar 
to the relationship of the parties to this appeal. The 
difference in the two cases is the position, in the contractor 
hierarchy, occupied by the injured worker. In this case, 
Bechtel was the general contractor at IPP. Owens-Corning, the 
plaintiff's actual employer, was an insulation subcontractor 
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who subcontracted with MSI, Mays's actual employer, for labor. 
The schematic of that relationship is as follows: 
BECHTEL 
* — 
OWENS-CORNING (PLAINTIFF) 
t 
MSI (DEFENDANT) 
In Hinds, Sprout Waldron & Company was the general 
contractor. Herm Hughes & Sons ("Hughes") was the 
subcontractor to construct a warehouse for the general 
contractor. Hughes contracted with Mark Hayes Masonry 
("Hayes") to construct the masonry walls in the warehouse. 
Hinds, an employee of Hayes, filed a tort claim when he was 
injured by the alleged negligence of an employee of Hughes. 
The case on appeal would be the same as Hinds if Alan 
Mays, an employee of MSI, were pursuing a claim against the 
plaintiff, an employee of Owens-Corning. That's not the case 
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here- The Hinds decision should be limited to its facts and 
does not control this appeal. 
The plaintiff contends that the 1975 amendments to 
Section 62 allow tort claims against anyone on the jobsite not 
the actual employer of the injured worker. This would include 
claims against a party qualifying as the injured worker's 
"statutory employer" under Section 42. This Court in Hinds, 
however, held that when considering "upstream" tort claims, the 
"statutory employer" definition of Section 42 is relevant in 
determining who is an employer and immune from tort liability 
under Section 62. By again injecting the Section 42 definition 
of "statutory employer" into the determination of those immune 
from tort claims under Section 62, the Court disregarded the 
language and intent of the Legislature in enacting the 1975 
amendment to Section 62. Regarding "upstream" tort claims, the 
Hinds decision throws the law back to its pre-1975 status. 
Hinds was improperly decided. The proper 
interpretation of the 1975 amendments to Section 62 is 
expressed by Justice Wilkins in his dissenting opinion in 
Hinds. He states: 
The 1975 amendment of "employer, officer, 
agent or employee of such employer" was 
inserted to define those persons who then 
and thenceforward would be immune from 
third-party civil action and is a 
manifestation of legislative intent to 
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eliminate from immunity those persons who 
fell under the umbrella of statutory 
employer prior to the amendment. And, as 
further evidence of this intent, the 
Legislature added the paragraph which 
begins with "For purposes of this section 
and notwithstanding the provisions of 
section 35-1-42. . . . " 
Because of these amendments, the only 
persons who now enjoy immunity from civil 
action should be the direct and actual 
employer (and, of course, his officers, 
agents and employees) of the injured 
workman. 
Id. at 566. 
This Court should overrule the Hinds decision and 
hold that third-party tort claims may proceed against anyone 
not the actual employer of the injured worker, even those 
qualifying as the injured worker's statutory employer. Such 
action is not, however, required to reverse the trial court's 
granting of the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in this 
case. 
The Hinds case involved an "upstream" claim against a 
party who may have qualified as the injured worker's "statutory 
employer." That is not the case on appeal here. MSI exercised 
no supervision or control over the plaintiff and, as such, 
could not qualify as the plaintiff's "statutory employer." MSI 
could not, therefore, be responsible to the plaintiff for 
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worker's compensation benefits and should not benefit from the 
exclusive remedy provision of Section 60. 
To affirm the trial court in this case would render 
the 1975 amendment to Section 62 meaningless. As stated in 
Hinds, the 1975 amendment "enables an employee to sue a 
tortfeasor, not his employer (or the employer's agent, etc.), 
even though the injured person and the tortfeasor may be 
engaged in the same employment." d^.. at 562. MSI argues that 
it is immune from tort liability because the plaintiff and 
Mays, an employee of MSI, are statutory co-employees under 
Section 42. Under the expansive language of Section 42, all 
workers on the jobsite are statutory employees of the general 
contractor. Under those circumstances, everyone on the 
jobsite would be immune from tort liability. The 1975 
amendments to Section 62, specifically allowing tort claims 
against non-employers, would be meaningless. If the 1975 
amendments are to have any purpose, the plaintiff must be 
allowed to pursue his claim against MSI, a subcontractor of the 
plaintiff's actual employer. 
Barring the plaintiff's claim does not comport with 
the policies underlying the Workers' Compensation Act. An 
employer is granted immunity from suit because, in being 
subject to providing worker's compensation benefits, the 
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employer assures qualifying workers a recovery. Subcontractors 
like MSI, with no supervision or control over the plaintiff, 
have no liability for compensation benefits to the plaintiff 
and, therefore, no policy for extending immunity exists. The 
defendants should not be allowed to benefit from the exclusive 
remedy provision of Section 60. If such benefit is allowed, 
the defendants have neither the potential obligation to pay 
worker's compensation benefits to the plaintiff, nor do they 
have any exposure to the plaintiff for tort liability. That 
type of protection was never contemplated by the Legislature 
and should not be upheld by this Court. 
B. Assuming That the Issue of Owens-Corningfs Control Over 
MSI is Relevant to the Determination of This Appeal, 
Genuine Issues of Fact Exist Which Reguire Remand for 
Further Proceedings. 
MSI's Motion for Summary Judgment focused on the 
supervision and control exercised by Owens-Corning over MSI. 
The plaintiff argues that, for the purposes of this appeal, the 
control, if any, exercised by Owens-Corning over MSI is ir-
relevant. MSI, as a "downstream" subcontractor exercising no 
control over the plaintiff, is not entitled to the exclusive 
remedy defense. MSI can escape tort liability in this case 
only by showing that it was the actual employer or, under 
Hinds, the statutory employer (although the plaintiff disagrees 
with the Hinds majority), of Riddle. Clearly, MSI was not the 
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actual employer of Riddle. Owens-Corning was. Whether MSI was 
the "statutory employer" of the plaintiff depends on the 
supervision and control MSI exercised over Riddle, not vice 
versa. As a subcontractor of Owens-Corning, MSI had no right 
of control over Riddle. MSI cannot qualify as the plaintiff's 
statutory employer and cannot, therefore, benefit from the 
exclusive remedy provision of Section 60. 
If this Court determines that the issue of Owens-
Corning 's control over MSI is somehow relevant in deciding the 
issues on appeal, genuine issues of fact were presented to the 
trial court regarding that control which require the reversal 
of the trial court ruling and the remand of this case for 
further proceedings. 
The question of control is a question of fact for the 
jury. Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1982). It is the 
right to control rather than the actual exercise of control 
that determines the relationship between the parties. Pinter, 
supra, at 309. The right to control is usually found in the 
language of a written contract between the parties. No such 
written contract exists between Owens-Corning and MSI and, 
therefore, the right to control must be determined by other 
factors. 
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Many factors have been applied in determining the 
right to control. Among those factors are actual supervision 
of the worker, the extent of the supervision, the method of 
payment, the furnishing of equipment for the worker, and the 
right to terminate the worker. Bennett v. Industrial 
Commission, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). 
Ken Riddle testified at his deposition that: (1) he 
did not supervise the work of Alan Mays (p. 19); (2) Maynard 
Crossland, a part owner of MSI, supervised and instructed Mays 
(p. 19); (3) Riddle had no authority to fire Mays without the 
approval of Maynard Crossland (p.94); and (4) MSI, not Owens-
Corning, paid Mays from MSI's payroll (p.95). It only takes 
one sworn statement under oath to dispose of the averments on 
the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact. 
W.W. and W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Mann, 680 P.2d 23, 24 (Utah 
1984). The sworn deposition testimony of the plaintiff is 
sufficient to create issues of fact regarding Owens-Corning's 
right to control MSI and summary judgment was, therefore, 
inappropriate. 
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CONCLUSION 
The language and intent of the 1975 amendments to 
Section 62 allow the plaintiff to pursue his claim against the 
defendants as a matter of law. That result is governed by this 
Court's decision in Shupe. While the plaintiff asserts that 
Hinds was wrongly decided and should be overruled, Hinds does 
not govern this appeal. MSI could not qualify as the 
plaintiff's "statutory employer" and, regardless of the Hinds 
decision, the plaintiff's claim against MSI is specifically 
allowed under Shupe and the language of Section 62. This Court 
should reverse the trial court ruling granting the defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and denying the plaintiff's Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment, and remand this case for trial on 
the plaintiff's negligence claim against the defendants. 
Owens-Corning's control over MSI is irrelevant to 
this appeal. Under Hinds, it is MSI's supervision and control 
over Owens-Corning and the plaintiff, which was none, that 
would be relevant to MSI's immunity. If this Court 
determines, however, that Owens-Corning's supervision and 
control over MSI is relevant, genuine issues of fact were 
presented to the trial court requiring reversal of the 
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grant ing of the defendant ' s Motion for Summary Judgment and 
remand for fur ther proceedings 
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APPENDIX A 
l -f l . Employers enumerated and defined • 
RrguUrly employed - Independent contractors. 
The following constitute employers subject to the 
ovisions of this title: 
(1) The state, and each county, city, town, and 
:hool district in the state, 
(2)(a) Every person, firm, and corporation, inci-
ting every public utility, having in service one or 
ore workmen or operatives regularly employed in 
c same business, or in or about the same cstabli-
>ment, under any contract of hire, express or 
ipiied, oral or written, except: 
(i) agricultural employers: (A) whose emplo-
yes arc all members of the immediate family of the 
nployer, which employer has a proprietary interest 
the farm, the inclusion of any immediate family 
ember under the provisions of this title being at 
ie option of the employer; or (B) who employ five 
fewer persons other than immediate family 
embers for 40 hours or more per week per empi-
r e for 13 consecutive weeks during any part of the 
•eceding 12 months; and 
(ii) domestic employers who do not employ 
nc employee or more than one employee at least 40 
Durs per week. 
(b) Employers of agricultural laborers and 
omestic servants have the right to come under the 
•rms of this title by complying with the provisions 
f this title and the rules of the commission. 
DIX A-l 
(3) As used in this section: 
(a) "Regularly* includes all employments in the 
usual course of the trade, business, profession, or 
occupation of the employer, whether continuous 
throughout the year or for only a portion of the 
year. 
(b) Where any employer procures any work to 
be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor 
over whose work he retains supervision or control, 
and this work is a part or process in the trade or 
business of the employer, the contractor, all persons 
employed by him, all subcontractors under him, and 
all persons employed by any of these subcontrac-
tors, arc considered employees of the original emp-
loyer. , 
(c) Any person, firm, or corporation engaged in 
the performance of work as an independent contr-
actor is considered an employer. 
(d) . 'Independent contractor" .means any 
person, association, or corporation engaged in the 
performance of any work for another who, while so 
engaged, is independent of the employer in all that 
pertains to the execution of the work, is not subject 
to the rule or control of the employer, is engaged 
only in the performance of a definite job or piece of 
work, and is subordinate io# the employer only in 
effecting a result in accordance with the employer's 
design. i9U 
APPENDIX A-2 
35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, 
agent or employee — Occupational disease ex-
cepted. 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for 
injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be 
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy 
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of 
the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil 
liability whatsoever, at common lawT or otherwise, to such employee or to his 
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of km, heirs, personal rep-
resentatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of any 
accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or 
incurred by such employee in the course of or because of or arising out of his 
employment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or 
against any officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any acci-
dent, injury or death of an employee. Nothing m this section, however, shall 
prevent an employee (or his dependents) from filing a claim with the indus-
trial commission of Utah for compensation m those cases withm the provi-
sions of the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act, as amended. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, $ 76; C.L. 1917, Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law, 
§ 3132; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. § 35-2-1 et seq 
1943, 42-1-57; L. 1949, ch. 52, § 1. Meaning of "this act". — See the note un-
Cross-References. — Employment of chil- der the same catchhne following § 35-1-46 
dren, § 34-23-1 et seq 
APPENDIX A-3 
35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of per-
sons other than employer, officer, agent, or em-
ployee of said employer — Rights of employer or 
insurance carrier in cause of action — Mainte-
nance of action — Notice of intention to proceed 
against third party — Right to maintain action 
not involving employee-employer relationship — 
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery. 
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this 
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other 
than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured 
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the 
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an 
action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and 
the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the 
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action 
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its 
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal 
representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not 
settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission. 
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of 
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or 
other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such 
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding. 
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Sec-
tion 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may 
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contrac-
tors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not 
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased 
employee at the time of his injury or death. 
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as 
follows: 
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, 
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their 
interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier 
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the 
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third 
party. 
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed 
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and 
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1). 
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in 
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation 
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 72; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3133; L. 1921, ch. 100, § 1; R.S. 1933, 
42-1-58; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-58; 
L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1: 1971, ch. 76, § 3; 1973, 
ch. 67, § 7; 1975, ch. 101, § 3. 
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THE COURT: 86-268, Riddle versus Mays and Mountain 
States Insulation. 
All right. Counsel, will you identify 
yourselves. 
MR. HAYES: Your Honor, Nelson Hayes appearing for 
the defendants, Mays and Mountain States Insulation. 
MR. JENSEN: Gordon Jensen appearing for Kenneth 
Riddle, the plaintiff. 
MR. HAYES: Your Honor, it's my motion to dismiss 
the case on the basis of workmen's compensation being an 
exclusive remedy. I think in fairness with what has been 
offered, I'm not going to spend a lot of time. I think 
we've briefed the subject. 
I think it's clear that there is — one thing 
that is clear is that there are — there is no real 
clarity in that area of the law. 
THE COURT: I love arguments like that. 
MR. HAYES: Well, Judge Murphy — they've attached 
a copy of Judge Murphy's decision. And if you read it, 
you find that he has some real problems in — with the 
case law telling him he should go one way. And he goes a 
different way based on what he perceives is a legislative 
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intent. 
The direction I'm going is I think our case 
is distinguishable between that case and the other cases 
that plaintiffs have cited and falls squarely within the 
provisions of the statute. And just let me outline what 
the relationships are. 
Owens-Corning is a contractor at Bechtel, and 
they're involved in insulation projects there. They hire 
Mr. Riddlef the plaintiff in the case, and he comes out 
from Missouri. And his responsibilities are erecting some 
scaffolding and to build a warehouse for Owens-Corning. 
THE COURT: Where was he building that? At the IPP 
project? 
MR. HAYES: At the IPP project. I don't know why 
the case is here in this court. But irrespective — 
THE COURT: I'm not sure either. 
MR. HAYES: But irrespective of why, it's here. 
After he's out here for a short period of 
time, he contacts his nephew, Mr. Mays, my client. He 
contacts his nephew and tells him to come out; that he's 
got employment for him here with Owens-Corning 
Corporation. 
Mr. Mays comes out and spends approximately 
three weeks working for Owens-Corning on the same work 
that Mr. Riddle was doing, the erecting of scaffolding and 
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building the warehouse. He's more of a "who me?" or a "go 
get this" type of a person as opposed to a skilled 
laborer. 
THE COURT: But was actually being paid by 
Owens-Corning and a regularly paid employee? 
MR. HAYES: Yes. And at some point, unbeknownst to 
Mr. Riddle, a contract developed by Owens-Corning — or 
he's not even sure therefs a contract — between 
Owens-Corning and Mountain States Insulation. 
And he says in his deposition — he says, "I 
don't know that there was a contract." 
I asked himf "Wellf let's assume there was a 
contract, for a minute. When did they start doing the 
work?" 
He answered, "I'm not sure." 
THE COURT: "They" being who? 
MR. HAYES: Mountain States Insulation. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. HAYES: "Stacey Eskelin and Maynard Crossland 
drove to the warehouse. He informed me who he was, and 
that they were going to be performing all the work on the 
project for Owens-Corning Fiberglass." 
The testimony was that at that point, 
Mr. Mays, my client, became an employee of Mountain States 
Insulation, doing the exact same work* that he had been 
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doing moments before for Owens-Corning Fiberglass, 
They proceed with Mr. Riddle not performing 
any of the physical functions or the physical labor — the 
plaintiff — but merely as a supervisor. And he testified 
as part of our memorandum, that -his responsibilities were 
supervision for not only the construction but also for 
safety of what was taking place; that he had 
responsibilities of being on the site every day and making 
sure that what was being done wasn't just for — wasn't 
just for what the design was r but to make sure it was done 
properly. And he had authority to make them redo it if it 
wasn't done properly. 
The reason this 
fit in with the provisions oj 
that there be supervision or 
is all material is that to 
E the statute, it's necessary 
control over the contractor's 
work. And we think that is quite clear right out of the 
mouth of Mr. Riddle himself. 
Mr. Mays or anyone else. We 
In his deposition, he said, ' 
controlled what was done." 
THE COURT: By whom? 
We haven't had to go to 
've gone right to Mr. Riddle. 
"Yes. I supervised and 
MR. HAYES: By Mountain States Insulation. And 
Mr. Mays, in particular, but other Mountain States 
Insulation employees. They were doing the same thing that 
he had been doing previously , erecting this scaffolding 
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and building this warehouse. 
THE COURT: Who was Mountain States Insulation 
working for? Were they employed by Corning? 
MR. HAYES: Corning, right. They were a 
subcontractor to Owens-Corninq. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. HAYES: And they then took over the employment 
or the employer responsibilities of Mr. Mays. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. HAYES: We have the one, then — the one key. 
And there's a whole bunch of provisions, but I'm not going 
to take the time to read that. I think we've laid them 
out in our memorandum where he talks about his supervision 
of that work and to the extent of being responsible for 
the safety that was taking place and the actual 
construction. 
The second part has to do with that the work 
done by the contractor has to be part or process in the 
trade or business of the employer. This is a classic case 
to the part that I just read. One day he's doing it, and 
the next day some people arrive, and they're now doing the 
exact same thing that he had been doing previously, and 
now his function is just to supervise what they're doing. 
He's an expert in this area and goes around the country 
and erects this scaffolding for this insulation purpose. 
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So we clearly fall within the category of 
35-1-42, which establishes for workmen's compensation, the 
"statutory employer." 
Now, our argument is not that Mountain States 
Insulation was an employer of Mr. Riddle. That's not our 
argument. Our argument is that Owens-Corning was the 
employer of not only Mountain States Insulation but also 
Mr. Mays. 
Clearly if Mr. Mays had been the one that was 
injured as opposed to Mr. Riddle, he would have been able 
to look to Owens-Corning should have Mountain States 
Insulation not had appropriate or accessible workmen's 
compensation. 
Clearly Mr. Mays, under the definition of the 
statute, is an employee of Owens-Corning. By the statute, 
35-1-60, it also provides that corporations, 
subcontractors, contractors and their employees can be 
employees of a contractor for the purposes of the act. 
So under the provisions of the statute, 
Mountain States Insulation is also an employee of 
Owens-Corning for the purposes of workmen's comp. 
Even if we don't find them — or even if we 
don't — or if the Court shouldn't find that Mountain 
States Insulation is an employee, clearly Mays is. And 
the only way they can get to Mountain' States Insulation in 
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the third-party claim is to claim imputed liability 
through the process of respondeat superior. If they can!t 
get to Mr. Mays because hefs an employee or a co-employee 
with Mr. Riddle, then they certainly can't get to Mountain 
States Insulation because they have to act through their 
employees. 
Now they raise the argument in this case that 
the statute was amended, and that 35-1-62 eliminates this 
kind of claim. The statute reads as follows: "When an 
injury or death for which compensation is payable under 
this title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or 
neglect of a person other than an employer, officer, 
agent" — and more critical — "or employee of said 
employer." 
It's clearly carved out that the act has to 
be by someone other than their employer. Of course 
Mr. Riddle can't sue Owens-Corning. He can't sue their 
officers or agents, or he can't sue an employee of said 
employer. 
Mr. Mays, being an employee of said employer, 
is thus immune from suit. If he's immune from suit, 
there's no circumventing that to go around him and sue 
Mountain States Insulation, claiming that "although we 
can't sue the co-employee, we can sue the co-employee's 
employer," so to speak. 
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The reason that that — this reasoning is 
proper is the cases cited by plaintiffs have to do with 
the idea that everyone on a project like IPP would thus be 
immune from suit if they were — if it would follow our 
rationale. Or that was their argument. If ycu follow my 
rationale, then everyone is immune from suit. 
That doesn't follow because in these 
contexts, you have this fellow servant or fellow employee 
context that has to fit into it where that the work that 
is being done places them in such close proximity, that 
there is risk of negligent harm. 
In this case, we have exactly that. We have 
Mr. Riddle supervising Mr. Mays and the other employees. 
They're in close proximity; they're doing the same work. 
It's not like someone else on the other side of the plant 
performing some other function on the IPP project under 
the umbrella of Bechtel, the main contractor. These 
provisions are carved out specifically so that those 
people working closely together and under each other's 
supervision have the protection of workmen's 
compensation. 
Now, there are some suggestions in 
Plaintiff's brief — and I think I should respond to it 
now — having to do with this concept of up the ladder or 
down the ladder — that there's some distinction there. 
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1 And I don't think that's a legitimate distinction. 
2 And the reason I don't think it's a 
3 legitimate distinction is if, in fact, Mr. Mays had been 
4 the one injured in this case, he would clearly be barred 
5 from suing Mr. Riddle. There's no doubt about it. He 
6 would be barred because Mr. Riddle was in that supervisory 
7 position over him, and he was doing the exact same work 
8 that Mr. Riddle had been doing previously. To suggest 
9 that Mr. Mays can't sue and Mr. Riddle can sue begs the 
10 whole concept of fairness. 
11 The Supreme Court, in the case of Smith 
12 versus Alfred Brown, made an interesting statement 
13 regarding that. They said: "It would be quite 
14 inconsistent with our ideas of even-handed justice to 
15 apply a liberal interpretation of the act in order to 
16 assure coverage to employees, but if it appears that there 
17 is other coverage, to then reverse the policy and apply a 
18 restricted view to exclude coverage in order to allow an 
19 employee to sue an employer. We think the ends of justice 
20 will best be served and the beneficial purposes of the act 
21 will be best accomplished for employees and employers 
22 alike, if the statute is applied in a uniform manner, 
23 whoever's rights may be at stake." 
24 I think that's the whole concept. To allow 
25 Mr. Riddle to sue Mr. Mays and Mountain States Insulation 
11 
and not let the reverse happen on the basis of some rigid 
concept of going up and down the ladder, I think is 
unfair. 
Justice Murphy — and I'm not suggesting, and 
I don't believe Plaintiff's counsel is suggesting that the 
decision of someone in the Third District has any 
precedential value. But even Judge Murphy recognized that 
this idea of up and down the ladder was totally 
inconsistent with the findings in Hinds versus Herm 
Hughes. 
In that case, they allowed to happen just 
exactly what we're asking the Court to allow to happen in 
this case. And the only reason that he deviated or went 
away from it is that he felt like it was inconsistent with 
legislative intent. 
We don't think so. We don't think that the 
legislature intended an unfair result. We think this is 
the classic case where Mr. Mays is a co-employee with 
Mr. Riddle, and that he should just take and has received 
workmen's compensation benefits for his injury. He should 
take those and be barred from third-party action. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. JENSEN: Gordon Jensen, representing the 
plaintiff, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: Yes, 
12 
MR. JENSEN: I've tried to explain in my memo what 
I understand this whole concept to be. And I think to 
understand exactly where we're going, it's important to 
know the different concepts that are being presented in 
35-1-42, which is — which defines parties who are liable 
to pay workmen's compensation benefits, and 
defines the parties who are subject to tort 
accidents that happen on a job site. 
35-1-62, which 
liability for 
Section 42, in defining those people who are 
subject to pay out workmen's comp benefits, is very, very 
broad and should be. Because the purpose of that 
particular statute is to protect anybody on 
from irresponsible employers who don't have 
compensation insurance. They can then look 
the job site 
worker's 
up the ladder 
and tag onto any other above them contractor or general 
contractor whose work is supervised by that contractor or 
who exercises the control and is part and parcel of that 
work that we've talked about that Mr. Hayes has mentioned. 
The courts have held for a long time that 42 
should be read very broadly because it's a i 
statute. It is meant to provide relief for 
hurt on the job. 
Section 62, on the other hand, 
remedial 
people who get 
defines those 
people who are subject to tort liability from accidents 
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1 that occur on a project. And the history of that statute 
2 is really interesting. It shows kind of a mess that we're 
3 in right now with regard to what the law has done and what 
4 the Supreme Court has. decided in cases like this. 
5 Before 1939, it simply said that you can 
6 pursue a claim against any third party who causes your 
7 injury. In 19 — 
8 THE COURT: If it will help you, I've read that --
9 I've read that portion of your brief, and I understand the 
10 development that you've traced there. 
11 MR. JENSEN: Thank you. Let me jump, then, to what 
12 has happened kind of recently that's kind of put the thing 
13 into kind of a problem. 
14 After 1975, it's the plaintiff's position 
15 that the amendments that were made in Section 62 were 
16 designed to do away with any ambiguity of jumping back and 
17 forth between Section 42 and Section 62. And that the 
18 amendment to Section 62 specifically said: "For the 
19 purposes of this section, and notwithstanding the 
20 provisions of Section 35-1-42, the injured employee may 
21 also maintain an action for damages against 
22 subcontractors, general contractors, independent 
23 contractors not occupying an employer/employee 
24 relationship with the injured or deceased employee." 
25 It's the plaintiff's position that that 
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amendment allowed a claim against anyone on the project; 
not the injured employee's actual employer. And that 
included a claim against a statutory employer up the 
ladder. He could pursue the claim. 
What happened unfortunately in the Shupe 
decision — which I think is an important decision, which 
is the first decision the Supreme Court decided after the 
1975 amendment — it presented a fact situation just like 
the one we have here. A general contractor's employee was 
hurt by a subcontractor's employee/ and they pursued the 
claim against the subcontractor. 
The trial court, relying on all of the 
previous opinions which had read the language "same 
employment" as basically encompassing everybody on the job 
site, granted the motion for summary judgment and said, 
"You can't pursue your claim against the subcontractor." 
They appealed that to the Supreme Court. 
In the interim, from the time of the accident 
until the appeal, this statute had been amended. The 
Court said, "In that case, if we're governed by the 
amended language of Section 62, we've got to reverse this 
summary judgment because it specifically says you can 
pursue this claim against the subcontractor." And it 
changed that "same employment" language that kind of made 
everybody on the project in the same employment immune 
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from tort liability. 
The Court, however, held that the pre-1975 
"same employment" language governed; that the amendment 
was not retroactive, and they affirmed the motion for 
summary judgment. 
It's our position that the reasoning of the 
Supreme Court now — certainly the 1975 amendment 
language — applies to this case. And any — 
THE COURT: Have there been any later cases decided 
on that point? 
MR. JENSEN: On the particular down the ladder, a 
general suing a subcontractor situation, I have not found 
a later decision. 
The only decision that's been decided that we 
have found is the Hinds versus Herm Hughes decision, which 
is an unfortunate case because it throws everything — 
THE COURT: Because it doesn't go your way? 
MR. JENSEN: No. I think it — I don't think it 
damages our position here. And Mr. Hayes stated that the 
Hinds — 
THE COURT: You think it's factually 
distinguisable? 
MR. JENSEN: Yes. Certainly. The big distinction 
is in Hinds versus Herm Hughes, it was a subcontractor 
pursuing a claim against an up-the-ladder contractor — a 
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general. 
In that case, the Court said, "We think 
whether you can pursue your claim up the ladder depends on 
whether or not this contractor is your statutory 
employer." Then they threw it back to the definition of 
42 and said, "If he!s a statutory employer, then we!re 
going to say that your claim is barred," and they sent it 
back for a factual determination on whether or not that 
general contractor was the injured party's statutory 
employer. 
I don't think Hinds versus Herm Hughes, 
while — if Mays were pursuing a claim against 
Owens-Corning, Hinds versus Herm Hughes would be 
precedent, I believe. He is suing up the ladder, and he 
is making a claim. 
The Supreme Court has held that when making a 
claim like that, whether that person is a statutory 
employer is important, and we're going to determine that. 
So if it were Ken Riddle pursuing a claim 
against Bechtel, or if it were Alan Mays pursuing a claim 
against Owens-Corning, I would be in trouble. Because 
Hinds versus Herm Hughes says, "If you're a statutory 
employer under those circumstances, we think that is 
important." 
This is a case that was not — the case that 
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w e ' r e dea l i ng with here was ne t addressed in Hinds versus 
Herm Hughes. We're going down the l a d d e r . And I want to 
t e l l you, Your Honor, why I b e l i e v e t h a t i s c r i t i c a l in 
t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c a s e . 
I th ink the Shupe reasoning t h a t you can 
pursue a c la im aga ins t your employer ' s subcon t r ac to r has 
no t been changed by Hinds ve r sus Herm Hughes. And i t 
s t i l l governs , and i t governs t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c a s e . 
Mr. Hayes sa id t h a t Hinds ve r sus Herm Hughes 
was t h i s c a s e . I t simply i s n ' t t h i s case a t a l l . We're 
going up in Hinds versus Herm Hughes, and we ' r e going down 
in t h i s c a s e . I want to exp la in why I th ink t h a t i s very 
i m p o r t a n t . 
THE COURT: Why do you think we're going down? 
MR. JENSEN: Because Mountain States Insulation is 
a subcontractor of Owens-Corning. I don't believe there's 
an allegation — and Mr. Hayes can correct me if I'm 
wrong — that Alan Mays is the actual employee — I mean 
there were actual contractive employment payments running 
back and forth with Owens-Corning. He was at one time an 
Owens-Corning employee. That employment terminated after 
a three-week period or something, and then he went on and 
became an employee of Mountain States Insulation. He was 
not paid by Owens-Corning. He was not on Owens-Corning's 
payroll at all. He was a Mountain States Insulation 
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1 employee. 
2 THE COURT: But Mountain States was in a sense — 
3 in the statutory sense, the employee of Owens-Corning, 
4 wasn ' t it? 
5 MR. JENSEN: I believe, Your Honor, that 
6 Owens-Corning — and I don't disagree that Owens-Corning 
7 would probably qualify as Mountain States1 statutory 
8 employer. And that would be important if Mays were 
9 pursuing a claim against Owens-Corning. 
10 THE COURT: Well, doesn't that make — speaking 
11 statutorily, doesn't that make Mays and Riddle 
12 co-employees of Owens-Corning? 
13 MR. JENSEN: It does for purposes of worker's 
14 compensation benefits if Mr. Mays were pursuing workmen's 
15 comp benefits. Because if Mountain States Insulation was 
16 insolvent or didn't have workmen's comp benefits, then he 
17 could under Section 42, because of the remedial nature of 
18 that statute, go as far up the ladder as he could go. 
19 THE COURT: Then what do we do about the first line 
20 of this 35-1-62 that says you can't pursue this kind of 
21 action against a co-employee? 
22 MR. JENSEN: What it says here — are you reading 
23 62 or — 
24 THE COURT: Yes. 62. "When an injury or death for 
25 which compensation is payable under this title shall have 
1 Q 
been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person 
other than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of 
said employer." 
MR. JENSEN: We believe that what they are talking 
about, particularly in light of 35-1-62, that says: "For 
the purposes of this section" — if you'll read further 
down there. 
THE COURT: Yeah. That's the next page. 
MR. JENSEN: For purposes of pursuing that 
third-party claim and notwithstanding the provisions of 
35-1-42 — meaning notwithstanding that definition of 
"employer" — you can pursue a claim against anybody who 
is not in a direct employee/employer relationship with the 
injured employee. 
Because our position. Your Honor, is that 
those two statutes must be separated. And that's why the 
Hinds versus Herm Hughes decision — that was the whole 
purpose of the 1975 amendment was to put an end to this 
kind of argument that says, "You're a statutory employee 
for this purpose, but you're not a statutory employer or 
statutory employer does or doesn't apply on a third-party 
claim. Let's put an end to that." 
In the 1975 amendment language, 
notwithstanding the definition of "statutory employer," an 
injured employee can pursue a claim against anybody not in 
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a direct employer/employee relationship with that injured 
employee. 
And then in the Hinds versus Herm Hughes 
decision, as far as suing somebody up the ladder ~ 
THE COURT: Let me just stop you right there. What 
you're telling me is, then, if you and I work for the same 
boss, and I injure you, you can sue me? 
MR. JENSEN: Absolutely not. 
THE COURT: Why not? 
MR. JENSEN: Because you and I are cc-employees of 
the same actual employer. 
THE COURT: But we're not in an employee/employer 
relationship. But I'm in an employee/employer 
relationship with this — 
MR. JENSEN: I agree that co-employees of the same 
employer cannot pursuit claims against each other. 
THE COURT: And what I'm saying is what is the 
difference between that situation and the Riddle/Mountain 
States Insulation situation where Mays is actually just an 
agent of the subcontractor? He's an employee of the 
subcontractor? 
MR. JENSEN: Because Alan Mays is not in an 
employer/employee relationship — actual employee/employee 
relationship with Owens-Corning. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
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MR. JENSEN: He may be in a statutory employer 
relationship, but is not in an actual employer/employee 
relationship. And this is — it kind of becomes important 
when you think about what can happen and the fear. 
THE COURT: Where is the definition of 
employer/employee relationship as it's used in 62? 
MR. JENSEN: It is our position and the legislative 
intent — if you'll read that memo — that the legislative 
intent of that employer/employee relationship is actually 
contractual. I'm your employee, and I am on your payroll. 
THE COURT: What do you cite for that proposition? 
MR. JENSEN: The legislative history of that 
statute. 
THE COURT: Read it to me again. I've read the 
memo. 
MR. JENSEN: "This language 'not in the same 
employment'" — this is when he was talking about doing 
away with this language. And this is. Your Honor, Paul 
Kunz, an AFL/CIO representative. 
"This language 'not in the same employment' 
has resulted" — 
THE COURT: That doesn't sound like legislative 
intent. That sounds like some labor organizer's 
interpretation. 
MR. JENSEN: What he was doing — they were asking 
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for the definition of what the intent of this statute 
was — what the purpose was. And I suppose — I don't 
know who sponsored the change, but this is when he came 
and said — 
THE COURT: I remember reading his statement, but 
you can go ahead. 
MR. JENSEN: "The object of the change is a matter 
of clarification so that the injured man will know that of 
course he has no right of action against his own 
employer. But when a stranger comes on the jobf whether 
he is a subcontractor or whether it be a stranger of any 
kind, that stranger is subject to the same rules of safety 
that any other stranger would be." 
Your Honor, it becomes kind of clear when you 
think of — now, Mr. Hayes mentioned — it just doesnft 
seem fair, this up and down the ladder thing. 
It supports fairness to allow this claim to 
go forward for this reason. Mr. Riddle could never 
recover worker's compensation benefits from Mountain 
States Insulation. They exercised no supervisory capacity 
or control over Ken Riddle. And that is the definition of 
a statutory employer for worker's compensation purposes. 
They would never have to pay worker's comp benefits to Ken 
Riddle. 
THE COURT: But he can get them from Owens-Corning. 
1 MR. JENSEN: He could get them from his own 
2 employer. What they're asking now is that "As far as Ken 
3 Riddle is concerned, we cannot be responsible under the 
4 statute for worker's compensation benefits, and now we're 
5 telling you that we cannot be responsible for tort 
6 liability for Ken Riddle either." 
7 They have no obligation to pay benefits; they 
8 have no tort liability. Certainly that kind of protection 
9 was never contemplated by the statute. 
10 The whole purpose of the exclusive remedy 
11 provision is that when you have an employer who is subject 
12 to worker's compensation benefit payments, that that ought 
13 to be — or someone who qualifies as that — they ought to 
14 be immune from tort liability. Up the ladder people like 
15 Owens-Corning; like Bechtel are responsible for worker's 
16 compensation benefits; therefore, they should be entitled 
17 to this immunity. 
18 Were Alan Mays pursuing a claim against 
19 Owens-Corning, they would be subject to pay him worker's 
20 compensation benefits, and therefore, that immunity ought 
21 to apply. 
22 There is no way that Mountain States would 
23 ever be subject to pay worker's compensation benefits to 
24 Ken Riddle. And now they're not going to pay that, and 
25 now they say we also don't have any tort immunity. 
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THE COURT: But if we go back to my previous 
statement, though, if you and I were working for the same 
boss, and I injure you, I don't pay worker's compensation 
either, but I enjoy the protections. What is the 
difference? 
MR. JENSEN: The difference is if I am injured by 
his employer or by someone down the ladder, it's the 
purpose of the benefit — what is the equity or the 
fairness in providing them the benefit of tort immunity 
when I may have workmen's comp benefits from my own 
employer? 
THE COURT: And what is the — I guess the problem 
I'm having is distinguishing between me and you being 
employed for the same person and Mountain States and 
Riddle being employed for the same person. It seems to me 
it's the same case. 
MR. JENSEN: Under "statutory employer," Your 
Honor — and I think the — this is the argument that has 
created so much confusion — I cannot — I mean Mays 
may — Mays and I — if I am Ken Riddle, under that broad 
Section 42 definition of "statutory employer," we may be 
able to claim compensation benefits from Owens-Corning — 
both of us. 
THE COURT: I understand that. I understand that. 
But you made the argument that there was some inequity in 
1 the fact that Riddle couldn't get employment compensation 
2 benefits from Mountain States. I don't see that as 
3 anything inequitable. It's the same situation. If you 
4 and I are employed for the same boss, I injure you, you 
5 have to get your money from the boss, not from me. 
6 MR. JENSEN: But if I am injured by an employee of 
7 Mountain States — for example, if I'm injured by you, and 
8 you are an employee with Owens-Corning — because I can 
9 collect workmen's comp benefits from Owens-Corning, I 
10 can't pursue a claim against you to recover for my 
11 injuries. If I'm injured by a Mountain States employee, I 
12 can't recover workmen's comp benefits from them, and the 
13 exclusive remedy applies to my employer, but I ought to be 
14 able to puruse a tort claim against that negligent 
15 employee of Mountain States. The exclusive remedy 
16 provision shouldn't bar that because they don't have to 
17 provide benefits. 
18 It's our position that the whole "statutory 
19 employer" question and the issue of Owens-Corning and Ken 
20 Riddle's control over Alan Mays and Mountain States is 
21 only applicable were Alan Mays pursuing a claim against 
22 Owens-Corning. Then the question of whether his claim 
23 would be barred as an up-the-ladder statutory employer 
24 would be relevant. 
25 THE COURT: All right. I think I understand your 
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position. I wish I knew the answer. 
MR. HAYES: Could I just point a couple things 
out? 
THE COURT: Are you finished, Mr. Jensen? 
MR. JENSEN: I just — I guess I just want to say 
that it is kind of frustrating because of some of the 
questions that have been — we're kind of in the same 
dilemma, I think, that Judge Murphy was in in his 
decision. 
He said that nI understand what I think the 
'75 language was supposed to do, and it was to preserve 
all claims." But now the Supreme Court has said that this 
issue of "statutory employer" is relevant in determining a 
claim — it is the plaintifffs position only if youfre 
pursuing a claim up the ladder — and that is why he 
denied that motion. 
He said: "To grant this motion" — "to grant 
this motion, completely obliterates anything that the 1975 
amendment was supposed to do." 
There is not a situation where you could 
pursue a third-party claim on a job site. There's not a 
situation. The whole language of Section 62 becomes void 
because you cannot pursue a claim. Because everybody 
starting from the lowest level subcontractor all the way 
to Bechtel —• everybody technically is a statutory 
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co-employee of that general contractor. All the way down 
the line there is immunity. And that was what the '75 
amendments were supposed to remedy, and now we1 re back in 
that situation again. If we grant this motion, we're back 
in a situation where nobody can pursue a third-party tort 
claim against anybody on the job site. Certainly not the 
intent of the legislature. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't quite view it that way. 
I don't think to grant the motion in this case would 
dictate that result. I mean I don't think that granting 
this motion would necessarily mean that nobody on that job 
site would be responsible to Mr. Riddle if they hit him. 
MR. JENSEN: Could you — I cannot think of a 
situation — 
THE COURT: I can. Anybody that does not work for 
Owens-Corning. 
MR. HAYES: The supervision and work done is part 
of the process of trade. Everyone outside of that — 
THE COURT: Anybody who does not work for 
Owens-Corning. 
MR. JENSEN: If you will look at the cases — the 
Smith decision and the cases that were decided before the 
1975 amendments — they held that a general contractor 
is — a general contractor is deemed to have supervision 
and control over everybody on the project. 
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I'm aware of that. I'm not applying 
saying that anybody who is not an actual 
Corning who injured an employee of 
r the 62 language that you cited could 
That's exactly what Alan Mays is. 
That's where I differ with you. 
I don't understand, then. 
I think Alan Mays is an employee of 
Under the "statutory employer" 
Well, even more under that — more than 
that, in view of the fact that he was an — he was working 
for an ent. 
relationsh. 
ity that 
ip with 
you want to call i 
relationsh. 
there, Mr. 
States; so 
correct? 
MR. 
was clearly in a contractual 
Owens-Corning — an actual employee, if 
t that, under a contractual 
Lp, receiving direct payments. 
I don 
Riddle 
ft think — given what you've said 
can't pursue any claim against Mountain 
, what is — that is your position; is that 
JENSEN: No. I think he can pursue any claim 
he wants against Moutain States. ' 
THE COURT: Well, my feeling is that he wouldn't be 
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able to because they're employed by the same employer. 
Even though one may be deemed an independent contractor/ 
there's an actual employment relationship there. 
MR. JENSEN: Kow would that differ from any 
other — and I certainly don't want to be argumentative. 
THE COURT: No. This is a puzzle to me. So any 
help you can give me would be appreciated. 
MR. JENSEN: How would that differ from any other 
subcontracted relationship on the project? I don't 
understand the difference between Owens-Corning 
subcontracting out certain insulation installation and any 
other contractor subcontracting out labor on any other 
part of their project. 
THE COURT: Well/ I see a distinction there. I 
think you can draw a distinction there. 
MR. HAYES: Well/ that's why Hinds/ I think -- you 
know, he doesn't agree with me that Hinds tells us that. 
But the reason that Hinds does is the Court goes back and 
looks and saysf "Well/ do you want to go up the ladder or 
down the ladder?" 
They're saying if Mr. Mays is in this 
position/ he can get his workmen's compensation from 
Owens-Corning, but because he's an employee/ he can't sue 
Owens-Corning. That's why Hinds is important to this 
particular case. 
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1 The Court looked for the determination of 
2 whether he could sue Owens-Corning to Section 42 to say 
3 he's an employee. He can'tf and that's why it applies to 
4 this case. And that is a decision after Shupe where the 
5 Court in dicta said "We're not considering what the 
6 amendments would dof this is what we're going to do based 
7 on the old case that was dieted." And then they came out 
8 with Hinds and saidf "This is how we're going to decide 
9 these cases on who is an employee." 
10 The other thing I think important is equity. 
11 And he's saying that the equity is against us because he 
12 can't sue MCI. The reason he can't sue MCI is that — it 
13 has to do with this concept of supervision. They are 
14 under the supervision of Owens-Corning. That is why it is 
15 equitable. If someone is telling you what to do out there 
16 and how to do it, they're the employer, and they're the 
17 ones responsible. Why should MCI get stuck when they're 
18 not the one that is calling the shots, even though they're 
19 a separate and distinct entity on the contract? 
20 It's a tough question, but I think this case 
21 fits in nicely to Section 62 where it says if you're an 
22 employee, you're barred from suing a fellow employee. I 
23 think it fits right there. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. 
25 MR. JENSEN: Well, Your Honor, I think we made our 
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position pretty clear. 
THE COURT: Well, I'll tell you what. As I read 
your briefs, I read, of course, the defendants1 brief 
first and thought "Well, good point. I ought to grant 
that motion.11 And then I read yours and thought "No, I 
shouldn't." And Ifm back to my original position. 
I'm going to grant the motion to dismiss, 
deny the motion for summary judgment, and let the Court of 
Appeals figure it out. 
MR. JENSEN: Can we just clarify should it be 
designed like a motion for summary judgment rather than a 
motion to dismiss? I think, you know — 
THE COURT: Well, it's entitled a "Motion to 
Dismiss." I guess in actuality, it's a motion for summary 
judgment. 
MR. HAYES: Yes. When we use the deposition of 
Mr. Riddle, I think — and that's fine. I'll prepare the 
order. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. JENSEN: Just to know how to designate an 
appeal — 
THE COURT: Now, I've decided opposite from Judge 
Murphy, haven't I? 
MR. JENSEN: Yes, you have. 
THE COURT: Good. The Court of Appeals is going to 
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have to give us some answers. 
MR. JENSEN: Thank youf Your Honor. 
MR, HAYES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, gentlemen. 
(Whereupon the proceedings in the 
above-entitled matter were concluded.) 
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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-8915 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH RIDDLE, ' 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALAN MAYS, and MOUNTAIN 
STATES INSULATION CORP., , 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
i PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM 
i IN OPPOSITION TO 
i DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
) DISMISS AND IN SUFPORT 
) OF HIS CROSS-MOTION FOR 
> SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
i Civil No. 86-268 
i Judge J. Phillip Eves 
The plaintiff submits this Memorandum in Opposition 
to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and in support of his 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment thatf as a matter of law, 
the defense of exclusive remedy is not available to the 
defendants. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Bechtel was the general contractor at the 
Intermountain Power Project ("IPP"). 
2. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation ("Owens-
Corning") was an insulation subcontractor at IPP to install 
insulation and paneling and to erect a warehouse. (Riddle 
depo., pp.11/15). 
3. The plaintiff, Kenneth Riddle, was employed by 
Owens-Corning. (Riddle depo., pp.10,15). 
4. Owens-Corning sub-subcontracted with Mountain 
States Insulation Corp. ("MSI") for MSI to provide labor to 
erect the warehouse. (Riddle depo., p.18). 
5. The defendant Alan Mays was an employee of 
MSI. (Defendants' Statement of Facts; Riddle depo., 
pp.19,94). 
6. The plaintiff was injured at IPP when the 
parked truck he was sitting in was hit by a truck driven by 
the defendant Alan Mays. Both men were working when the 
accident happened. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPLICABLE STATUTES, CASE LAW AND 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ALLOW THE PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIM AGAINST MSI AND, AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY DEFENSE 
IS NOT AVAILABLE TO MSI 
MSI claims that the plaintiff and MSI are statutory 
co-employees of Owens-Corning and, therefore, the plaintiff's 
tort claim against MSI is barred by the exclusive remedy 
provision of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60. MSI bases its claim 
on the language of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42(3)(b) ("Section 
42"). The defendants' memorandum does not, however, address 
the effect of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62 ("Section 62"). A 
clear understanding of the relationship between these two 
statutory provisions is essential in deciding the issues 
presented by these motions. Section 42 and Section 62 have 
distinct purposes. Section 42 defines those liable for 
worker's compensation benefits. Section 62 defines those 
parties against whom an injured worker may pursue tort 
claims. 
Section 42 represents a class of statutes known as 
"statutory employer" statutes. The purpose of such statutes 
is to allow injured workers to reach beyond irresponsible, 
uninsured employers by imposing ultimate liability for 
benefits on "up the ladder" contractors. Jacobson v. 
Industrial Commission, 738 P.2d 658 (Utah App. 1987). The 
entire "statutory employer" scheme indicates a desire on the 
part of the legislature to extend the protection of worker's 
compensation benefits to those who might not be deemed 
employees under the common law. Pinter Construction Co. v. 
Frisby, 678 P.2d 305 (Utah 1984). The remedial purpose of 
the Worker's Compensation Act supports the conclusion that 
Section 42 should be construed in favor of protecting the 
injured employee. Bennett v. Industrial Comm., 726 P.2d 427 
(Utah 1986). 
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Section 42, therefore, expands the definition of 
those liable for worker's compensation benefits beyond the 
injured worker's actual employer. It creates the concept of 
the "statutory employer" who, although not the actual 
employer of the injured worker, so controls and supervises 
that worker's actual employer as to become liable for 
compensation benefits. This concept provides more assurance 
that benefits will be available to an injured worker if his 
actual employer proves irresponsible and uninsured. It also 
pressures general contractors to make sure subcontractors are 
insured. 
Section 62 allows tort claims by injured employees 
against third parties. Before 1939, Section 62 allowed an 
injured worker to pursue tort claims against a neglignt 
"third person." In 1939, the "third person" language was 
changed to allow claims against "another person not in the 
same employment" as the injured employee. This was designed 
to protect the injured worker's actual employer and co-
employees because the employer was liable to the injured 
worker for worker's compensation benefits under Section 42. 
After the 1939 amendments to Section 62, something 
unforeseen and unintended by the legislature began to happen. 
To determine who was "in the same employment" as the injured 
worker under Section 62, the Utah Supreme Court began 
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applying the "statutory employer" definition of Section 42. 
In other words, the Court applied the Section 42 expanded 
definition of employer, used to define those liable to pay 
worker's compensation benefits, to determine who was "in the 
same employment" as the injured worker and, therefore, immune 
from tort liability under Section 62. The practical effect 
of these court decisions was to insulate from tort liability 
everybody on the construction project. This was because, as 
a practical matter, under Section 42, all workmen on a 
project had a common statutory employer, usually the general 
contractor. Therefore, all were deemed to be "in the same 
employment" under Section 62 and unable to pursue claims 
against each other, whether up or down the ladder. See 
Adamson v. Okland Construction Co., 29 Utah 2d 286, 508 P.2d 
805 (1973); Smith v. Brown, 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994 
(1972); Galleqos v. Strinqham, 21 Utah 2d 139, 442 P.2d 31 
(1968). Section 62, specifically allowing third party 
claims, was becoming meaningless. 
In 1975, the Utah Legislature moved to reestablish 
its initial intent and to remedy the injustice created by 
these judicial decisions. At that time, the Legislature 
amended Section 62 to clarify who was subject to third-party 
liability suits. The "same employment" language, which had 
5 
created generalized immunity, was changed to read that a tort 
claim could be maintained against a person "other than an 
employer, officer, agent or employee of said employer." 
Then, in a very significant addition, the Legislature added 
the following language to Section 62: 
For the purposes of this section and 
notwithstanding the provisions of section 
35-1-42, the injured employee . . . may 
also maintain an action for damages 
against subcontractors, general contrac-
tors, independent contractors . . . not 
occupying an employer-employee relation-
ship with the injured or deceased 
employee . . . [Emphasis added.] 
The language and legislative intent of these 1975 
amendments are clear. The liberal definition of "statutory 
employer" in Section 42, used to determine liability for 
compensation benefits, is not to be used in determining who 
is or is not subject to tort liability under Section 62. The 
judicially-created interplay between Section 42 and Section 
62 was expressly eliminated. The injured worker's tort claim 
was preserved against all those "not occupying an employer-
employee relationship" with the injured employee. 
The legislative history of the 1975 amendments is 
equally clear that only the employee's actual employer was to 
be protected from tort liability. On February 25, 1975, the 
Senate moved to a Committee of the Whole to have the 
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amendments explained by Mr. Paul Kunz, an AFL-CIO representa-
tive. He stated, in part: 
Kunz: . . . [T]his language . . . "not 
in the same employment" has resulted in a 
number of court decisions that have 
completely eliminated the protection that 
the worker had. . . . [T]he object of the 
change . . . is a matter of clarifi-
cation so that the injured man will know 
that of course he has no right of action 
against his own employer, but when a 
stranger comes on the job, whether -it be 
a subcontractor . . . or whether it be a 
stranger of any kind, that stranger is 
subject to the same rules of safety . . . 
that any other stranger would be. 
In Shupe v. Wasatch Electric Co., 54& P.2d 896 
(Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court addressed the 1975 
amendments to Section 62 as they relate to an injured 
worker's ability to sue "downstream" subcontractors (such as 
MSI in this case). In Shupe, the heirs of a deceased 
employee of the general contractor brought a wrongful death 
action against a subcontractor. The accident happened before 
the 1975 amendments which eliminated the "same employment" 
language from Section 62. 
Applying the "same employment" language and 
following the judicial precedent of Adamson, Smith, etc., the 
trial court found that the general contractor's employee and 
the subcontractor were "in the same employment" and granted 
summary judgment in favor of the subcontractor based on 
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exclusive remedy. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
explained that the summary judgment in favor of the sub-
contractor would have to be reversed if the 19 7 5 amendments 
to Section 62, specifically allowing tort claims against non-
employers, applied. The Court held the amendments not 
retroactive and affirmed. 
The bottom line of the Shupe decision is that after 
1975, an injured worker may sue a subcontractor of his 
employer. The exclusive remedy defense does not apply to the 
subcntractor. Riddle may, therefore, pursue his claim 
against MSI as a matter of law. 
The plaintiff acknowledges that after Shupe, the 
majority in Hinds v. HermeS Hughes, Inc., 577 P.2d 561 (Utah 
1978) held that, when considering "up-the-ladder" tort 
claims, the "statutory employer" definition of Section 42 is 
relevant in determining who is an employer and immune from 
tort liability under Section 62. Hinds is an unfortunate 
decision. Regarding suing "up the ladder," it throws the law 
back to its pre-1975 status. It fails to acknowledge the 
language and intent of the Legislature in enacting the 1975 
amendment to Section 62, and overlooks the language of Shupe. 
Regardless of the consequences Hinds may have on 
"up-the-ladder" tort claims, it does not affect the plain-
tiff's ability to pursue his claim against MSI. The clear 
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language of Shupe, allowing "downstream" tort claims, was not 
altered by the Hinds decision. 
To grant the defendants' motion would render the 
1975 amendment to Section 62 meaningless. As stated in 
Hinds , the 1975 amendment "enables an employee to sue a 
tortfeasor, not his employer (or the employer's agent, etc.), 
even though the injured person and the tortfeasor may be 
engaged in the same employment." Icl. at 562. MSI argues 
that it is immune from tort liability because Riddle and MSI 
are statutory co-employees under Section 42. Under the 
liberal language of Section 42, all workers on the jobsite 
are statutory employees of "up-the-ladder" contractors. 
Under those circumstances, everyone on the jobsite would be 
immune from tort liability and the 1975 amendment to Section 
62, specifically allowing tort claims against non-employers, 
would be meaningless. So would the Shupe and Hinds opinions, 
which provide that an injured worker is able to sue a 
tortfeasor who is not his employer. 
Finally,* MSI's position does not comport with the 
quid pro quo concept behind the Worker's Compensation Act. 
The concept is that statutory employers are granted immunity 
from suit because, in being subject to providing worker's 
compensation, they assure qualifying workers a recovery. 
Downstream subcontractors like MSI, with no supervision or 
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control over the plaintiff, have no liability for compensa-
tion benefits to the plaintiff and, therefore, there is no 
quid pro quo. MSI is not entitled to benefit from the 
exclusive remedy provision of the worker's compensation 
statute. If such benefit is allowed, MSI has neither the 
obligation to pay compensation benefits nor any exposure to 
tort liability. That type of protection was never con-
templated by the Act. 
The issues presented by these motions were recently 
addressed by Judge Michael Murphy of the Third Judicial 
District Court. A copy of Judge Murphy's Summary Decision 
and Order in that matter is attached for the Court's review. 
In that case, Judge Murphy denied a motion for summary 
judgment made, as is the case here, by a "downstream" 
subcontractor alleging that the plaintiff and the subcontrac-
tor were statutory co-employees under Section 42 and that the 
plaintiff's exclusive remedy was worker's compensation. 
Judge Murphy then granted the plaintiff's motion that, as a 
matter of law, the-exclusive remedy defense was not available 
to the subcontractor. 
Based on the above arguments, the defendants' 
motion to dismiss should be denied and this Court should 
rule, as a matter of law, that the defense of exclusive 
remedy is not available to MSI. 
10 
POINT II 
ASSUMING, WITHOUT ADMITTING, THAT THE ISSUE 
OF OWENS-CORNING'S CONTROL OVER MSI IS RELEVANT 
TO THE DETERMINATION OF THE DEFENDANTS' MOTION, 
GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT EXIST WHICH PRECLUEE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Point II is to be considered only if the Court 
rejects the plaintiff's position in Point I. MSI's motion 
focuses on the supervision and control exercised by Owens-
Corning over MSI. The plaintiff argues that, for the 
purposes of this motion, the control, if any, exercised by 
Owens-Corning over MSI is irrelevant- As explained in Point 
I of this memorandum, MSI, as a "downstream" subcontractor 
exercising no control over the plaintiff, is not entitled to 
the exclusive remedy defense. The only way MSI can escape 
tort liability in this case is to show that it was the actual 
employer or, under Hinds, the statutory employer (although 
the plaintiff disagrees with the Hinds majority), of Riddle. 
Clearly, MSI was not the actual employer of Riddle. Whether 
MSI was a "statutory employer" depends on the supervision and 
control it exercised over Riddle. As a downstream sub-
contractor, MSI had no right of control over the Riddle. 
Owens-Corning's control over MSI is irrelevant. 
If, despite this argument, this Court determines 
that the issue of Owens-Corning's control over MSI is somehow 
relevant in deciding the defendants' motion, genuine issues 
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of fact exist regarding that control which preclude summary 
judgment. The question of control is a question of fact for 
the jury. Moloso v. State, 644 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1982). 
As stated by the defendants, it is the right to 
control rather than the actual exercise of control that 
determines the relationship between the parties. Pinter, 
supra at 309. The right to control is usually found in the 
language of a written contract between the parties. No such 
written contract exists between Owens-Corning and MSI and, 
therefore, the right to control must be determined by other 
factors. 
Many factors have been applied in determining the 
right to control. Among those factors are actual supervision 
of the worker, the extent of the supervision, the method of 
payment, the furnishing of equipment for the worker, and the 
right to terminate the worker. Bennett v. Industrial 
Commission, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). 
Ken Riddle testified at his deposition that: (1) 
he did not supervise the work of Alan Mays (p.19); (2) 
Maynard Crossland, a part owner of MSI, supervised and 
instructed Mays (p.19); (3) Riddle had no authority to fire 
Mays without the approval of Maynard Crossland (p.94); and 
(4) MSI, not Owens-Corning, paid Mays from MSI's payroll 
(p.95). It only takes one sworn statement under oath to 
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dispose of the averments on the other side of the controversy 
and create an issue of fact. W.W. and W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. 
Mann, 680 P.2d 23, 24 (Utah 1984). The sworn deposition 
testimony of the plaintiff is sufficient to create issues of 
fact regarding Owens-Corning's right to control MSI and 
precludes the granting of defendant's motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on Point I, MSI, as a matter of law, is not 
entitled to the defense' of exclusive remedy. The defendants' 
motion should be denied and the plaintiff's cross-motion for 
summary judgment disposing, as a matter of law, of the 
exclusive rememdy defense, should be granted. 
Owens-Corning's control over MSI is irrelevant to 
the issues to be decided by this Court. Should the Court, 
however, determine that Owens-Corning's control over MSI is 
somehow relevant, the defendants' motion should be denied 
because genuine issues of fact exist regarding that control 
DATED thj 
1988. 
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shall be criminally liable as a party for 
such conduct. 
You are instructed that the term "Dis-
tribution for Value" means to deiiver a 
controlled substance in exchange for 
compensation, consideration, or item of 
value, or a promise therefor. 
You are instructed that under the law-
marijuana is a controlled substance. 
The first paragraph of Instruction 6B 
incorporates, in haec verba, provisions of 
76-2-202. It is applicable here, because 
the Controlled Substance Act does not spe-
cifically provide otherwise, nor does its 
context otherwise require. 
Instruction 6A defines a misdemeanor, 
Instruction 6 a felony. The jury was giv-
en two verdicts, one responding to Instruc-
tion 6A and one responding to Instruction 
6. The jury, having an opportunity to 
consider both, elected to return a verdict in 
response to No. 6. 
[2] A further' contention of defendant 
is that it was improper to give Instruction 
63 since there was no factual basis on 
which to ground an instruction concerning 
aiding and abetting. State v. Bairn:1 is cit-
ed as authority for this contention. The 
case is distinguishable from the present 
one, in that here there was conflicting evi-
dence from which the jury couid have 
found defendant aided and abetted. In 
Bcum i: was otherwise, the court noting: 
. . . There was no evidence to 
show, and no one claimed, that the de-
fendant but aided or abetted in the com-
mission of the offense, or, not being 
present, advised or enco'uraged its com-
mission. 
In view of there being no such evidence, 
the court held that to give such a charge 
was misleading and harmful. 
Here there was testimony o: the under-
cover agent that his discussions preceding 
the saie. were with defendant, but at the 
time of the saie one Gooch brought the 
package from the kitchen and demanded an 
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extra $5 as a condition to transfer. De-
fendant testified he was not involved with 
the transaction, although he was present, 
and for unknown reasons the agent handed 
the money to him. Since all parties agreed 
that Gooch was an active participant m the 
sale, and the evidence concerning defend-
ant's role was sharply conflicting, an in-
struction on aiding and abetting was prop-
er. 
KEXRIOD, C. J., and ELLETT, 
CROCKETT and TUCKETT, TJ., concur. 
Elna A. SHUPE, and Yavette Shupe, by and 
through her guardian ad litem, Elna A. 
Shupe, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
Y. 
WASATCH ELECTRIC COMPANY, INC., a 
Utah Corporation, and Esco Corporation, 
an Oregon Corporation, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 14117. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 20, 1976. 
Wrongful death action was brought 
against electrical subcontractor by wife 
and daughter of deceased employee of gen-
eral contractor. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, Stewart M. Hanson, L, 
granted defense motion for summary judg-
ment and plaintiffs appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Tuckett, T., held that deceas-
ed was in ''same employment" within prior 
statute to effect that, when death for 
which compensation is payable shall have 
been caused by wrongful act or neglect of 
another person not in same employment, 
dependents may claim compensation and 
his heirs or personal representatives may 
also have action for damages against such 
I. 47 Utah 7. IZ1 P. ZIS (l91o). 
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third person and that later statutory 
amendment authorizing personal represen-
tatives of deceased employee to maintain 
action against subcontractor not occupying 
employee-employer relationship with de-
ceased could not apply. 
Affirmed. 
Maughan, J., dissented and filed opin-
ion. 
1. Workmen's Compensation C=2i66 
General contractor's workman, who 
was electrocuted, was in the "same em-
ployment" as electrical subcontractor, with-
in prior statute providing that when death 
for which compensation is payable shall 
have been caused by wrongful act or ne-
glect of another person not in same em-
ployment, his dependents may claim com-
pensation and his heirs or personal repre-
sentatives may also have action for dam-
ages against such third persons; thus wife 
and daughter of deceased workman were 
not entitled to recover from subcontractor 
on theory that electrocution had been due 
to subcontractor's negligence. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-42, 35-1-62, 6S-3-3. 
2. Workmen's Compensation C=58 
Statute providing that injured employ-
ee or his heirs or personal representatives 
may maintain action for damages against 
subcontractors, general contractors, inde-
pendent contractors, property owners or 
other lessees or assigns, not occupying an 
employee-employer relationship with de-
ceased employee at time of his death did 
not apply retroactively to case of death of 
general contractor's employee who was * 
electrocuted allegedly as result of negiect 
o: electrical subcontractor. U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-62, 6S-3-3. 
D. Clayton Fairbourn, Sal: Lake City, 
for plaintiffs and appellants. 
Richard K. Moffat, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and respondents. 
546 P.2c—57 
TUCKETT, Justice: 
This is a wrongful death action brought 
by the plaintiffs who are the wife and 
daughter of a deceased workman who was 
m the employ of Christiansen Brothers 
Construction Company. The district court 
granted a motion for summary judgment 
by the defendants, and the plaintiffs ap-
peal. 
Christiansen Brothers Construction Com-
pany was a general contractor engaged in 
the construction of condominiums in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. The defendant Wasatch 
Electric Company was a subcontractor who 
agreed to design, furnish and install all 
the necessary electrical wiring and equip-
ment at the construction site. Prior to 
July 19, 1974, Wasatch had installed elec-
trical cables for the purpose of supplying 
power to a crane owned and operated by 
Esco Corporation. On July 19, 1974, Tom 
Shupe, a carpenter, was employed by the 
general contractor and was performing 
carpentry work on the construction site. 
The electrical cable had been draped over 
certain metal forms and reinforcing steel. 
Due to defective or insufficient insulation 
of the cables, electrical energy escaped 
from the cables and energized certain metal 
cement forms that Shupe was working 
with, resulting in his electrocution. 
[1] Plaintiffs filed their complaint 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 35-
1-62, U.C.A.1953, the pertinent part of 
which reads as follows: 
When any injury or death for which 
compensation is payable under this title 
shall have been caused by the wrongful 
act or neglect of another person not in 
the same employment, the injured em-
ployee, or in case of death his depen-
dants, may claim compensation and the 
injured employee or his heirs or personal 
representatives may also have an action 
for damages against such third person. 
The term ''same employment" used in the 
statute has oeen defined by this court in a 
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number of prior decisions. The case of 
A damson v. Okland Construction Co.1 was 
a wrongful death case wherein the plain-
t iffs decedent who was an employee of a 
subcontractor sought to recover from the 
general contractor. Likewise in Smith z\ 
Alfred Brown Co} the plaintiff, an em-
ployee ox the subcontractor, sued the gen-
eral contractor to recover for injury sus-
tained on the job. In both of those cases 
the general contractor, by the terms of the 
contracts, retained supervision and con-
trol over the subcontractors. The provi-
sions of Section 35-1-42, U.C.A.1953, 
which defines employers who are subject 
to the provisions of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, provides coverage for the 
employees of subcontractors where super-
vision or control is retained by the employ-
er who employed the subcontractor, and 
all such persons employed by such sub-
contractors shall be deemed to be employ-
ees of the original employer. In Smith 
and A damson above referred to the con-
tract provisions providing for control and 
supervision of subcontractors for the gen-
eral contractor are quite similar to con-
tract provisions in this case. We do not 
believe that in this case the plaintiffs' 
decedent was an employee of the general 
contractor rather than being an employee 
of the subcontractor as was the case in 
Smith and A damson, is a sufficient dis-
tinction to take the case out of the rule 
enunciated in those cases. 
The legislature, undoubtedly being aware 
of the decisions of this court construing the 
terms "same employment" in 1975 amend-
ed Section 35-1-62. U.C.A.1953, by adding 
the following provision: 
For the purposes of this section and 
notwithstanding the provisions of Sec-
tion 35-1-42, the injured employee or 
his heirs or personal representative may 
also maintain an action for damages 
!. 29 Utah 2d 256, 50S P.2d SOZ. 
2. 27 Utah 2d 155. 493 P.2d 994. 
against subcontractors, general contrac-
tors, independent contractors, property 
owners or their lessees or assigns, not 
occupying an employee-employer rela-
tionship with the injured or deceased 
employee at the time of his injury or 
death. 
The amendment if applicable would leave 
the plaintiffs in court. 
The defendants contend that the amend-
ment can have only retrospective effect 
and that the amendment was adopted and 
became effective after the plaintiffs' cause 
of action arose. The early case of Mcrcur 
Gold M. & M. Co. v. Spry 3 dealt with the 
problem in the following language: 
Constitutions, as well as statutes, 
should operate prospectively only, unless 
the words employed show a clear inten-
tion that they should have a retrospective 
effect. This rule of construction as to 
statutes should always be adhered to, 
unless there be something on the face 
of the statute putting it beyond doubt 
that the legislature meant it to operate 
retrospectively. 
The rule in that case has been codified in 
Section 6S-3-3, U.C.A.1953, which reads as 
follows: 
No part of these revised statutes is 
retroactive, unless expressly so declared. 
[2] The amendment above referred to 
provides a cause of action on behalf of 
an injured workman against individuals 
not covered by the statute prior to its 
amendment. To apply the statute retro-
actively would compel a new class of in-
dividuals to assume risks which did not 
exist prior to the amendment, and we are 
of the opinion that retroactive application 
would deny equal protection to a new class 
brought within the terms o: the statute as 
amended so as to deprive them of equal 
protection of the laws. 
3. IG Utah 222. 52 P. 3S2 ; In re hxc-ahavis 
Estate, 106 Utah S3T. 14S ?.2d 340; Petty 
r. Clark, 113 Utah 205. 192 P.2d 5S9. 
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The other contentions of the plaintiffs as 
grounds for a reversal we deem to be with-
out merit. 
The judgment of the court below is af-
firmed. No costs awarded. 
J-
HENRIOD, C. J., and CROCKETT, 
, concur. 
MAUGKAN, Justice (dissenting): 
For the following reasons, I dissent: 
The issue in this matter is whether un-
der Section 35-1-62, U.C.A.19S3, a sub-
contractor is a third person "not in the 
same empoyment," with an employee of a 
general contractor. The majority opinion 
relies on A damson v. Okland Construction 
Companyl and Smith v. Alfred Brown 
Company2 and holds them applicable in 
the instant fac: situation. In both these 
cases, a general contractor was held to be 
the statutory employer under Section 35-
1-42(2) of the employees of a subcontrac-
tor and therefore not within the exception 
set forth in Section 35-1-62—distinguish-
able situations. 
The language of Section 35-1-42 clearly 
shows the legislative intent. The initial 
sentence provides: 
The following shall constitute employ-
ers subject to the provisions of this title: 
Title is the key word here. Thus the defi-
nitions of Section 42 insofar as a "statu-
tory employer" is involved is to be applied 
to the entire act. In contrast, subsection 2 
provides those who are to be deemed "stat-
utory employees" are made so only for 
the purposes of that section. Section is 
hert the key word. The pertinent provi-
sions of subsection 2 are: 
Where any employer procures any 
work to be done wholly or in part for 
him by a contractor over whose work 
he retains supervision or control and 
such work is a part or process in the 
trade or business of the employer, such 
1. 29 Utah 2d 256. 50$ P.2d S03 (1973). 
2. 27 Utah 2d 153, 493 P.2c 994 (1972). 
contractor, and all persons employed by 
him, and all subcontractors under him, 
shall be deemed, within the meaning of 
this section, employees of such original 
employer. . . . 
The legislature specifically has express-
ed an intention that its definition of a 
statutory employer remain constant 
throughout the Workmen's Compensation 
Act. In contrast, its definition of who 
are statutory employees is e:** ressly con-
fined to those provisions whc-ein the re-
sponsibility flowing to them from the stat-
utory employer is set forth. 
The definition of a third person "not in 
the same employment" is not the subject 
of 35-1-42(2). The concept of "all persons 
in the same employment" does not include 
subcontractors, and their employees, on the 
same project; thus they are not immune 
as co-employees of an employee of a gen-
eral contractor.3 
The legislature in enacting Section 25-
1-42 was not concerned with third-party 
tort liability; its purpose was to establish 
a general statutory definition of an em-
ployer, to assure that a general contractor 
would guarantee compensation for the em-
ployees of a subcontractor. Where a stat-
ute such as Section 35-1-42 makes the 
general contractor the employer for pur-
poses of the compensation statute certainly 
he should enjoy the regular immunity of 
an employer from third-party suit when 
the facts are such that he could be made 
liable for compensation. The majority of 
courts have so heid.4 
the overall responsibility of 
the general contractor for getting sub-
contractors insured, and his latent liabili-
ty for compensation if he does not, 
should be sufficient to remove him from 
the category of "third party." He is 
under a continuing potential liability; he 
has thus assumed a burden in exchange 
for which he might well be entitled to 
3. 2 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, 
Section 72.20. pp. 14-44 to 14-46. 
4 Id., Section 72.31 p. 14-47. 
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immunity from damage suits, regardless 
of whether on the facts of a particular 
case actual liability exists. This burden 
may also be translated into financial 
terms. . . . The general contractor, 
by insisting that the subcontractor carry 
compensation insurance, imposes a cost 
on the subcontractor which the subcon-
tractor will pass on to the contractor in 
his charges under the subcontract.5 
When the positions are reversed, and 
an employee of the general contractor, 
or the general contractor himself as sub-
rogee sues the subcontractor in negli-
gence, the great majority of jurisdic-
tions have held that the subcontractor is 
a third party amenable to suit. The 
reason for the difference in result is 
forthright: the general contractor has 
a statutory liability to the subcontractor's 
employee, actual or potential, while the 
subcontractor has no comparable statu-
tory liability to the general contractor's 
employee.6 
Frohlick Crane Service, Inc. v. Mack " is 
factually similar to the instant action. 
There, an empioyet of the genera] contrac-
tor sued the subcontractor for negligence. 
The trial court dismissed the action on the 
ground that plaintiff was suing his co-
err.pioyee, and such suit was no: permissible 
under a statute which permits an employee 
to bring an action against a person "not 
in the same employ." The ruiing of the 
trial court was predicated on a statute 
which provided that an employer, who con-
tracts part of his work to a subcontractor, 
is deemed to be the employer of the sub-
contractor and his employees for Work-
men's Compensation purposes. 
The Supreme Court of Colorado stated 
that to treat the two parties as co-employ-
ees would be exalting form over substance, 
5. Id.. Section 72.C1, pp. 14-55 to 14-56. 
6. Id., Section 72.32. pp. 14-66 to 14-6S. 
for statutory interpretation must be gov-
erned by legislative intent. The purpose 
of the Workmen's Compensation Act was 
to afford compensation for work-related 
injuries, regardless of fault. The em-
ployer, in return for his responsibility un-
der the act is granted immunity for com-
mon-law claims, but the act does not shield 
third-party tort feasors. To prevent an 
employer from avoiding responsibility un-
der the act by contracting his work to an 
uninsured contractor, the statute provides 
that a subcontractor and his employees 
are deemed to be the employees of such an 
employer. These provisions do not indi-
cate a legislative intention that a subcon-
tractor should be free of responsibility for 
his own negligence. The court held, in 
accordance with the great weight of au-
thority, that subcontractors are subject to 
suit by employees of the general contrac-
tor. 
A valuable common-law right should 
not be deemed destroyed by a statute, ex-
cept by explicit language. The instant 
action is not a case where the claimant's 
right to compensation is dependent upon 
labeling the general contractor as a statu-
tory employer. 
The proper interpretation of the phrase 
"not in the same employment" (35-1-62), 
in the absence of a true employer-employee 
relationship, renders a subcontractor a 
third party not immune to a common-law 
negligence action by an employee of the 
general contractor. 
This cause should be reversed, and re-
manded for trial on its merits. 
ELLZTT, J., concurs in the views ex-
pressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr. 
Justice Maughan. 
7. Colo.. 510 P.2d S91 (1973). 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
R. BRENT BARBOUR, : SUMMARY DECISION 
AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : CIVIL NO. C-8S-2386 
WESTERN SHEET METAL, INC., : 
et al., 
Defendants. 
PAULSEN ENGINEERING & : 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MECHANICAL CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
Third Party Defendant. 
CATE EQUIPMENT COMPANY, : 
Third Party Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
MECHANICAL CONSTRUCTION, INC., : 
Third Party Defendant. : 
Defendant Western Sheet Metal, Inc. ("Western") has filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the grounds that plaintiff and 
Western are statutory co-employees under Section 35-1-42(3)(b), 
BARBOUR V. WESTERN 
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Utah Code Ann., and plaintiff's exclusive remedy under Section 
35-1-60 is workers1 compensation. The court took the matter 
under advisement following a hearing on February 22, 1983. 
Paulsen Engineering & Construction Company ("Paulsen") was 
the general contractor on the project where plaintiff was 
injured. Paulsen subcontracted with Mechanical Construction, 
Inc. ("MCI") for plumbing services. MCI in turn subcontracted 
with Western for construction of heating, ventilation and air 
conditioning facilities. Plaintiff was an employee of MCI. 
This court previously granted Paulsen's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the grounds that Paulsen was a statutory employe*^ and 
Hinds v. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 561 (Utah 1973) 
mandated workers1 compensation as plaintiff's exclusive remedy. 
Western now argues that the inexorable extension of the ruling on 
Paulsen's motion requires the granting of its motion. The 
resolution of this issue presents a very difficult balancing of 
this court's obligation to adhere to both judicial precedent and 
clear legislative mandate. This resolution must begin with an 
analysis of the Hinds decision. 
As acknowledged in this court's previous ruling, the 
majority opinion in Hinds did not ignore the 197 5 amendments to 
Section 35-1-62, Utah Code Ann. The Court quoted the amended 
section and then indicated its import: 
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This amendment enables an employee to sue a 
tortfeasor, not his employer (or the employer's agent, 
etc.), even though the injured person and the 
tortfeasor may be engaged in the same employment. 
Hinds v. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc., supra at 562. 
Even though it appeared that Section 35-1-62, as amended, would 
allow the employee/plaintiff to sue the statutory employer who 
was not his actual employer, the Court did not apply Section 3 5-
1-62 to override Sections 35-1-42 and -60. No explanation was 
given by the Court and the decision presented no analytical 
framework for lower courts to determine the applicability of 
Section 35-1-62 in cases presenting different fact situations. 
One matter, however, is clear, i.e., the Court indirectly 
acknowledged the amendments to Section 3 5-1-62 effected a change 
in the doctrine flowing from the previous statutory language "not 
in the same employment.ff 
Section 3 5-1-62, as amended, then, must be considered by 
this court as effecting some change in the previous statutory 
scheme as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court. If this court 
were to determine that the Hinds decision and this court's 
previous ruling on the Paulsen motion required the granting of 
Western's motion for summary judgment, the 1975 amendments to 
Section 35-1-62 would have no effect whatsoever, and immunity 
would blanket the workplace. The Hinds decision by its reference 
to Section 35-1-62 suggests otherwise but fails to provide the 
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analytical framework to determine the nature and extent of the 
amendments f effect. 
This court is left with judicial precedent indicating the 
19 75 amendments constitute some legislative change and a 
statutory enactment dictating that plaintiff is net precluded 
from proceeding against Western. In this circumstance, the court 
must adhere to the latter legislative dictates and deny Western's 
motion. Such adherence is perhaps incongruous with and not the 
logical extension of the Supreme Court's failure to apply Section 
35-1-62, as amended, in Hinds.1 It is, however, consistent with 
the legislative mandate as it applies to this plaintiff and this 
defendant. Any incongruity is not created by the statutory 
scheme but by the Hinds decision. Such incongruity caused by a 
judicial repeal of a portion of the 1975 amendments, however, is 
^The quid pro quo concept has been suggested as a 
reconciliation of this court's ruling today with the Hinds 
decision. The concept has been relied upon and significant in 
many Utah Supreme Court decisions addressing workers1 
compensation. The quid pro quo concept is this: statutory 
employers are granted immunity from suit because in being subject 
to workers' compensation they assure qualifying workers of 
moderate recovery. Since contractors such as Western have no 
liability under workers' compensation for workers such as 
plaintiff, there is no quid pro quo. It is suggested, then, that 
contractors such as Western situated downstream from the claimant 
should not benefit from the exclusive remedy provision of the 
workers' compensation statutes. The court acknowledges this 
suggestion as a possible reconciliation but does not adopt it as 
a basis for its ruling. 
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not a reason for this court to deem the amendments completely 
repealed.2 
As indicated in this court's ruling on the Paulsen motion, 
employers may well have planned their affairs over the last ten 
years in reliance on Hinds. Nevertheless, in light of the dicta 
in Shuoe v. Wasatch Electric Co., 546 P. 2d 896 (Utah 1976) and 
uncertainly as to the reach of Hinds beyond the exact facts there 
presented, it is not so clear that a business could reasonably 
plan its affairs in reliance on workers' compensation being the 
exclusive remedy when an enterprise is downstream in the 
contractual hierarchy. Nevertheless, given the language of 
Section 35-1-62, as amended, this court does not believe the 
"upstream-downstream" argument of plaintiff is a legitimate basis 
to distinguish Hinds. Additionally, the court does not rely on 
^Any such incongruity is quite obviously not unique to 
Anglo-American jurisprudence and the judiciary's interpretation 
of statutory schemes. For example, in 1922 the United States 
Supreme Court decided that professional baseball was not within 
the scope of the federal antitrust laws. This was confirmed 31 
years later because of the profession's longstanding reliance, 
stare decisis, and deference to legislative correction. Toolson 
v. New York Yankees, 34'6 U.S. 356 (1953) . As a practical master, 
then, the ruling had evolved into a judicially created exemption. 
Other professional sports such as Softball, football and boxing 
have never been afforded the same exemption. The United States 
Supreme Court itself has acknowledged the differing treatment as 
possibly "unrealistic, inconsistent or illogical." Nevertheless, 
the Court has refused to overrule the exemption for baseball even 
though conceding that the exemption for baseball would never have 
been created in the 1950fs. Radovich v. National Football 
League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957). 
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Shupe as authority for its denial of Western's Motion. The court 
does note, however, the hierarchical comparison of the instant 
case to the facts in Hinds and Shupe. The facts in Hinds are 
comparable to the relation which plaintiff bears to Paulsen; the 
facts in Shupe are comparable to the relation which plaintiff 
bears to Western. 
For the reasons set forth herein, defendant Western's Motion 
for Summary Judgment is denied, and plaintiff is granted its 
requested Summary Judgment on Western's affirmative defense that 
workers1 compensation is plaintiff's exclusive remedy. The court 
has taken an additional day beyond that promised to issue its 
decision. The additional time was necessary for the court to 
both resolve the issue and give the parties at least a summary 
articulation of the reasons for the ruling. 
Dated this 24th day of February, 1988. 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY ' 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KENNETH RIDDLE, ) 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
ALAN MAYS, and MOUNTAIN STATES ] 
INSULATION CORP., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
ALAN MAYS AND MOUNTAIN 
STATES INSULATION 
I CORPORATION'S MEMORANDUM 
1 IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
i TO DISMISS 
1 Civil No. 86-268 
) Judge J. Phillip Eves 
Defendants Alan Mays and Mountain States Insulation, by 
and through their counsel of record, Nelson Hayes, RICHARDS, 
BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON, hereby respecrfully submit nhis 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of their Motion 
to Dismiss. 
INTRODUCTION 
Alan Mays and Mountain States Insulation are filing a 
Motion to Dismiss plaintiff Kenneth Riddle1s Complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff Kenneth Riddle, an employee of Owens-Corning, 
was sitting in his parked truck when he claims he was hit by a 
truck driven by defendant Alan Mays, a Mountain States 
Insulation (hereinafter "MSI") employee. The accident: 
occurred at the site of the Intermountain Power Project 
(hereinafter "IPP") in Delta, Utah. Both men were working at 
the time the accident occurred. As a result of the accident, 
plaintiff claims that he injured his head and neck. 
At the time of the accident, Owens-Corning was doing 
construction for the IPP. It had contracted out the 
construction of a warehouse at the project to MSI. Mr. Mays 
was an employee of MSI, working on the IPP warehouse. 
Owens-Corning authorized Mr. Riddle to supervise the warehouse 
construction, and in particular, to oversee the safety aspects. 
ARGUMENT 
OWENS-CORNING IS THE STATUTORY EMPLOYER OF 
ALAN MAYS AND MOUNTAIN STATES INSULATION. 
Under the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, workmen's 
compensation is the exclusive remedy of an employee not. only 
against the employer, but also against any employees of the same 
employer. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 (1953 as amended). The Act 
defines "employee" broadly, to include not only traditionally 
defined employees, but also contractors, subcontractors and 
their respective employees: 
Where an employer procures any work to be 
done wholly or in part for him by a 
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contractor over whose work he retains 
supervision or control, this work is part 
or process in the trade or business of the 
employer, the contractor, all persons 
employed by him, all subcontractors under 
him, and all persons employed by any of 
these subcontractors, are considered 
employees of the original employer. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42(3)(b) (1953 as amended). This broad 
definition of the employer-employee relationship is known as the 
"statutory employer" doctrine. 
Thus, contractors and their employees may be "employees" 
of the original employer for workmen's compensation purposes. 
When an employer, such as Owens-Corning, hires a contractor, 
such as MSI, both the contractor and all of the contractor's 
employees may qualify as employees of the original employer. In 
order for a contractor and its employees to be "employees" of 
the employer for workmen's compensation purposes, (1) the 
employer must retain "some supervision or control over the 
contractor's work," and (2) the work done by the contractor must 
be "part or process in the trade or business of the employer." 
Bennett v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 726 P.2d 427, 431 
(Utah 1986). 
The facts indicate that Owens-Corning retained control 
and supervision over the work MSI was hired to do at the 
IPP, and that building the warehouse, which Owens-Corning 
hired MSI to do, was part or process of Owens-Coming's 
business. Therefore, MSI and Alan Mays are "employees" of 
Owens-Corning for workmen's compensation purposes, and as such, 
may not be sued by Kenneth Riddle, another Owens-Corning 
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employee. 
A. Owens-Corning had the Right to Supervise and Control 
MSX's Work. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Pinter Construction Co, v. 
Frisby analyzed the degree of control an employer must 
exercise for purposes of §35-1-42. Pinter Construction Co. 
v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305, 308-9 (Utah 1984). The issue in 
Pinter was whether Clifford Frisby, hired by Pinter 
Construction Co. to install metal siding on a maintenance 
building, was an "employee" for workmen's compensation 
purposes. The Court held that he was, citing several factors as 
evidence of control: 
Pinter's control over Frisby was evidenced 
on at least four occasions when Pinter 
directed Frisby to get on with the work and 
expressed concern about the deadlines for 
finishing the job. Pinter's assertion of 
some control over Frisby's activities 
indicates that Pinter in fact had the right 
to control and could have done so 
frequently. It is not the actual 
exercise of control that determines whether 
an employer-employee relationship exists; 
it is the right to control that is 
determinative. 
Pinter at 3 08-9. The Court also found that (1) the employer 
providing the material for the job, (2) inspections and 
consultations by the employer's employees, and (3) the 
employer's supervisor-overseeing the contractor's work, were 
evidence of actual control by the employer. Pinter at 3 08. 
In the instant case, the evidence shows that 
Owens-Corning had the right to control the MSI warehouse 
project, and therefore MSI is an "employee" of Owens-Corning 
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for workmen's compensation purposes. Owens-Corning's 
employee, Kenneth Riddle, met with the MSI supervisor, 
Maynard Crossland, on a daily basis. Mr. Riddle would also 
be on the job, overseeing the progress of the warehouse, as 
MSI and Mr. Mays were working. Mr. Riddle's testimony clearly 
establishes not only Owens-Coming's right to control and 
direct MSI's work, but its actual control over the MSI 
project: 
Q And you were in the job when he [Alan 
Mays] was performing his activities? 
A Yes. 
Q You were there and you would oversee 
what was happening? 
A Exactly. 
Q As Mountain States would perform their 
work? 
A Right. 
Q And if it wasn't being done properly, 
you had authority to require that it be 
done properly? 
A Exactly. 
Q And you had authority to, as a result of 
your involvement with Owens-Corning and 
your knowledge of OSHA regulations and 
so on and so forth, you had authority to 
make sure that it was done safely? 
A Yes. 
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Q And you could tell Mr. Crossland or 
the people who worked under him how to 
do the work if it wasn't being done 
safely? 
A Yes. 
Q And if it was being done improperly, you 
could require that they do it properly? 
A Yes. 
Riddle Depo., pp. 21-22. 
Therefore, the conduct of Owens-Corning and MSI 
clearly shows that Owens-Corning had the right to control and in 
fact actually controlled MSI's work such that their 
relationship was that of employer-employee for purposes of 
workmen's compensation. Pursuant to §35-1-42, the statutory 
employer doctrine, if MSI, as contractor, is an "employee" of 
Owens-Corning for workmen's compensation purposes, it follows 
that Mr. Mays is also an "employee" of Owens-Corning. 
B. The Construction of the Warehouse by MSI is Part or 
Process of Owens-Corning's Business. 
The second prong of the workmen's compensation test for 
the employer-employee relationship, "process in the trade or 
business," was defined by the Utah Supreme Court in Lee v. 
Chevron Oil Co.: 
All those operations which entered directly 
into the successful performance of the 
commercial function of the principal 
employer . . . . If the work is of such 
character that it ordinarily or 
appropriately would be performed by the 
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principal employer's own employees in the 
prosecution of its business, or as a 
central part in the maintenance thereof, it 
is a part of [sic] process of his work. 
Lee v. Chevron Oil Co., 565 P.2d at 1131. The facts 
establish that the work performed by MSI, the construction of 
the warehouse, was in fact the kind of work usually performed by 
Owens-Coming's own employees. In fact, Owens-Corning began 
to construct the warehouse itself. After three weeks, 
Owens-Coming decided to contract out the project to MSI. The 
construction of the warehouse was an essential part of 
Owens-Corningfs business, which was to build the IPP. 
Mr. Mays himself was originally employed by 
Owens-Corning to build the warehouse. Then, when Owens-Corning 
decided to contract out the warehouse construction, Mr. Mays 
continued doing the same work he was doing for Owens-Corning but 
was paid by MSI. In both circumstances, he was supervised by 
Mr. Riddle, an employee of Owens-Coming. 
Therefore, the evidence shows that the construction of 
the warehouse at the IPP was not only essential to 
Owens-Coming's business, but was an activity originally 
carried on by Owens-Corning's own employees. Accordingly, the 
construction of the warehouse by MSI was part or process of 
Owens-Coming's business. 
C. If Owens-Corning is a Statutory Employer of MSI, 
MSI, Alan Mays and Kenneth Riddle are all Employees 
of Owens-Corning. 
Section 35-1-60 precludes employees who have received 
workmen's compensation benefits not only from suing their 
- 7 -
employer, but also from suing other employees of the same 
employer. Since Owens-Corning is a statutory employer of MSI 
and Alan Mays, pursuant to §3 5-1-42, Kenneth Riddle cannot bring 
suit against MSI or Alan Mays after receiving workmen's 
compensation benefits from Owens-Corning. The Utah Supreme 
Court has held Ma worker can be hired and paid by a 
subcontractor but still be an employee of the general 
contractor." Bambrough v. Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286, 1291 
(Utah 1976). If an employee has the same employer as another 
employee, "he is entitled to and must accept workmen's 
compensation and cannot maintain an action against either of 
them [the employer or another employee of the same employer] for 
negligence in causing his injuries." Bambrough at 1239. 
See also Gallegos v. Stringham, 442 P.2d 31 (Utah 
1968) (plaintiff and defendant held to be working for the same 
employer, and therefore plaintiff cannot recover outside 
workmen's compensation). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Owens-Corning satisfies the 
requirements of the statutory employer doctrine. Owens-Corning 
had the right to supervise and control the work performed by 
MSI. In addition, the construction of the warehouse performed 
by MSI was a part or process of Owens-Corning's business. 
Accordingly, Owens-Corning is a statutory employer of both MSI 
and Alan Mays, and therefore neither MSI nor Alan Mays May be 
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sued by another Owens-Corning employee, Kenneth Riddle. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^"? day of February, 
1988. 
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NEESON/L. HAY/ES-. 
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Attorneys-^for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed on this ^J^LSL day of February, 
1988 to the following counsel of record: 
Bryan A. Larson 
Robert J. Debry 
Robert J. Debry & Associates 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 501 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
RIDDLE2/TAMI 
9 -
